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While the writer was an undergraduate he spent two 
Summers in the Panamint mountains above Death Valley, Cali-
fornia. Hiking with one of the few old-timers remaining in 
that region~ he noticed that "the old desert rat" would 
stoop occasionally to pick up certain rocks which he would 
examine closely. Some went into a pouch he carried. They 
were later crushed and "panned." If they made a "showing" 
in the gold-pan, the prospector would retrace his steps and 
arduously search for the parent vein. In similar fashion 
the writer has ventured upon interesting features in the 
life and character of the man, Antiochus Epiphanes. It is 
the aim of this dissertation to seek all of the facts con-
cerning his life, assay them and then seek to accurately 
appraise them uninfluenced by the propaganda of the past. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
1. Statement of the problem. The problem of this disserta-
tion is the critical study of all the sources of the life of 
Antiochus Epiphanes, in an earnest effort to properly 
evaluate them and thus arrive at an accurate appraisal of the 
relations of Antiochus IV Epiphanes with the Jews of Palestine. 
) 
3 
2. tustification 2f !n! ~roblem. There are valid reasons 
for a restudy of this phase of the history of Antiochus 
Epiphanes. Writers have been prone to refer to his policy 
of Hellenization as forced upon his unwilling subjects when 
even antagonistic sources plainly say that the privileges of 
Hellenism were earnestly sought and consIdered a mark of the 
1 king's special favor. 
Again the tendency of historians up to the last decade 
has been to overlook the vast importance of the history of 
the Middle and Far East upon the policy of the Seleucids. 
This bias is caused by an understandable lack of knowledge 
on the part of western writers about these vast inland 
reaches of this mysterious oriental Eapire. 
The Character of Antiochus itself has been obscured 
by the bitter hatred of his adversaries. It is easy to com-
prehend the motives behind the disparagement of Antiochus by 
his detractors. The Jews looked upon him as their great 
enemy. They spoke of his desecration of their temple as 
"the abomination of desolation." One of their five great 
festivals was in celebration of the rededication of the 
temple after the forces of their persecutor no longer con-
taminated the sacred precincts. The Hellenistic writers on 
the other hand, apart from their descending to the level of 
mere gossi~mongers at times, were definitely anti-Syrian in 
their sympathies. Guided by these sources the historians 
1. II Macc. 4:9. 
4 
have termed Antiochus a fool, vain, silly and theatrical.2 
His title was misunderstood or consciously twisted and a pun 
made by changing his name from Epiphanes, Illustrious (as 
they interpreted it), to Epimanes, ¥adman.3 While admitting 
the ability of the man, modern writers follow the earlier 
trend calling him, hysterical, half-mad;4 blustering, savage 
and terror-stricken;5 superficial, BOhemian;6 vindictive.?' 
Tarn however in this decade has drawn a brilliant picture of 
him as a forceful, intelligent and far-seeing ruler who 
might have done great things had his success not been pre-
cluded by his early death. 8 Swain, another writer of this 
decade has said, nalthough hardly a statesman of the first 
rank, he was an intelligent and able man. n9 
2. Bactria, p. 183; Cf. pp. 35, 75. 
3. Polyb. 26:1S:::Athen. 10:439a; Livy 41:20. The 
proper translation of Epiphanes, as Antiochus title, should be 
manifest god. It is possible also to translate it in the less 
exalted sense of lllustrious~ The latter senee is necessary to 
the turn of the pun. 
4. Walter otto, Zur Geschichte der Zeit des 6 Ptol-
emaers (Wissenschaften:-1934), p.=S4. ---- ---
5. G. A. Frank Knight, Kil~ ~ Jordan (London: 1921), 
pp. 450-5. 
6. B.S. , 131. 
7. Bouchi-Leclercq, Bistoire dee §eleucids (Paris, 1914), 
p. 262. 
8. Bactria, Chapter IV, pp. l29ff. 





More particularly OttolO has recently made a careful 
study of this period which has been fruitful especially in 
dealing with the origins of the Sixth Syrian War. Tarn has 
brought out the importance of the eastern influence on the 
policy of this ruler. ll Just recently Swain has rightly 
pointed out the fact, hitherto given insufficient considera-
tion, that there was a general upsurge of the oriental peoples 
throughout the"East. 
This dissertation will concern itself more specifically 
with the problem of the relation of Antiochus to his 
Palistinian-Jewish subjects and the Maccabean Struggle in 
the light of a corrected view of Antiochus' general char-
acter and policy. 
II. THE SOURCES 
1. P~cient Sources. 
a. polybius. Polybius is our best source for the general 
history of this period. His work (as we have it) is not 
~ 
complete but the gragments extant are very helpful. Polybius 
was an accurate and critical historian. He wrote to justify 
the ways of Rome. He admitted that he sought to persuade 
the Achaean League to send a force to Egypt to oppose 
Antiochus there, yet he fairly sought to give an unbiased 
10. 'If-. Ott!?, QIt •. Cj. t~. 




I'" . . , 
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appraisal of the Syrian's character.12 Polybius does not 
have any information concerning the Jews or the Kaccabean 
struggle. Bis knowledge was delimited by the western part 
of Syria in the East. When Antiochus III or his son 
Epiphanes went East they dropped out of sight. 
b. Appian. This Alexandrian historian who wrote about the 
middle of the Second century A.D. divided his history upon 
ethnographic lines. .Bis Syrian Wars shed light on the sub-
ject discussed here. Appian is very brief but he crowded an 
abundance of material into a small compass. Be is quite 
reliable and of large importance. 
c. I Maccabees. I Maccabees is our best source for the 
struggle between the anti-hellenic Jews and their Syrian 
overlords. It is of course biased. Perhaps the author was 
an eye witness to the events described. 
d. Daniel. The eleventh chapter of Daniel is as excellent 
a picture of the Seleucid relations with Egypt as we have when 
the peculiarities of its style and purpose are understood. 
The accuracy of the account of the war between Antiochus and 
the Ptolomies ceases after the day at E1eusis and the 
persecution of the Jews which followed. Verses 11:40 ff. are 
not clear. Charles says that the rest of the chapter is 
prophecy and was not completely and accurately fulfilled. 13 
12. Polyb. 29:23ff; 28:18. 





The brevity and obscurity of the apocalyptic style of the 
book make it difficult to understand. 
~. II Maccabees. Jason of Cyrene wrote a five volume work 
--
on the Kaccabean struggle. A later writer made a one book 
epitome of Jason which is known as II Maccabees. The Second 
Book of the Maccabees has recently experienced a great turn 
of fortune. From the lowest opprobrium it has been raised to 
the heights by the championship of Heise in his Crit!£ ~ 
beideq Makkabaet and his Geshichte der Griechischen ygg 
Makedonlsch ~ten. nIt is an edifying disturbance of 
accepted opinion. n14 Rostovtzoff says of the two Maccabees 
and Josephus, "These sources are sufficiently based on good 
evidence to give a picture which is substantially correct."15 
£. Josephus, Antiquities Qf the~. Josephus, son of 
Mattathias, a priest, was one of the leaders of the Jews in 
their rebellion against Rome during the First Christian 
Century. Be was captured by Vespasian and became a favorite 
of the man who was soon to be Emperor. The Antiquit~ was 
written in Greek for a Roman audience in order to familiarize 
the Romans with the essentials of Jewish history. Josephus 
was not above touching up the narrative. Be shows confusion 
in his ,history of the period before the outbreak of the 
revolt against Antiochus. His account of the revolt differs 
from that of the two books of the Maccabees. 
14. S.S., p. 168, n. 2. 







g. ~. Titus Livius wrote 142 books on the history of 
Rome. Books 41-45 bear on the subject of this inquiry. Livy 
was neither critical nor accurate. Be was manifestly biased 
in favor of Rome. Be has served history most by preserving 
otherwise unpreserved portions of Polybius. 
n. Diod~rus Siculus. The forty books of Diodorus covereda 
'period of eleven hundred years. Unfortunately only the first 
five are extant in their entirety. The other books, important 
as they are, are available only in miserable fragments dis-
covered here and there. Books 29-34 cover the period under 
investigation. 
a. Strabo. The Geography of Strabo has historical notes in 
it. From these notes fragmentary information can be gleaned 
for the whole period. 
~.. Justin. In Augustus' time Trogus Pompeius (Justinus), 
wrote 44 books upon the subject of the history of Macedon and 
the Diadochi. The work was good but is only extant in an 
epitome which Justinus drew up. It is important for western 
history, but when the East is discussed the epitomist mangled 
th~ information miserably. For the Eastern Campaign of Anti-
ochus it is important in that it is often the only source 
available. 
~. Qassius Dio. Dio has a few crumbs of knowledge about 
Antiochus. The information is most fragmentary and none of it 
is not given in some other source. 
I ~' 
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2. Modern writers. 
---
a. fi. !. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization. This standard 
work is helpful in understanding the dominant civilization 
underlying the world history of the period under examination. 
b. !. W. Tarn I ~ Qreeks in Bactria ~ India. This book 
has been the greatest contribution to the knowledge of the 
subject of this study. Tarn has been very daring in many of 
his statements but subsequent investigation has vindicated 
much of his pioneer work. He paints Antiochus Epiphanes as 
an able, brilliant and resourceful ruler. While he quails 
at the word "statesman", Tarn's characterization cemtainly 
would indicate that classification for his hero. Tarn is 
one of the few who have taken the history of the middle and 
Farther East into account in his evaluation of Seleucid 
history. 
c. HQstovtzeff, Soci~l and Economic Historr of !he 
Hellenistic World. This epoch-making contribution stands 
alone in its unique contribution to the study of Hellenistic 
History. The vast store of knowledge necessary to the social 
and economic approach to the history of the period has been 
found in the brain of this Russian scholar. He opens new 
fields of information in the study of causation as he re-
veals and correlates these underlying causes behind the 
events of history. 
d. Bevan, ~ House 2! Seleucus, Vol. 11, This is a good 
I 
10 
standard work in the field of Seleucid history. It is care-
fully done and of pract.1cal help. 
e. !. ~, Zur Geschichte ~ Zeit des 2 ptolemaers. Tarn 
speaks of this book as the best in the field. It is a careful 
study of the subject from the Egyptian point of view. 
Rostovtzeff follows Tarn in rejecting the view of this author 
with regard to the results of Eleusis. 
f. !. Kolbe, Beitrage !Yt §lrischen und Judische~ 
Geschichte. Kolbe has worked out the chronology for the period 
carefully and from excellent sources. His chronology is 
accepted as standard. 
g. 1. Schurer, A Historz Qi ~ Jewi§b People in !n~ ~ 
2! Jesus £hrist. Here is a careful and exhaustive work much 
of which, however, has now been outdated. 
h. !. I_ EamseY, Ib& Qities of ~. Paul. The vast knowledge 
of this student of Hellenism is of value to us in the study of 
the Greek City in the Seleucid Empire in the part of his work 
which takes up a historical study of the city of Tarsus. 
, 
i. Bouche-Leclercq, H1stoire des Seleucids. This is the 
best of the French works in the field. It is carefully and 
thoroughly prepared. The author goes into all the problems 
of the subject. Pages 123-315 cover the Seleucids from 
Antiochus III to Antiochus V. 
3. Other Works. 
a. Cambridge Ancient History. This standard work is especially 





Volume VIII. The Third volume of plates is helpful in a study 
of the coins of Antiochus Epiphanes. 
b. I. I. Newell, Boyal Greek Portrait Coins. This volume 
contains the coins by which the succession of Antiochus IV 
to the throne of Syria is traced. Because of the unavailability 
of the British Museum Catalogue, this volume has been most 
helpful. 
c. i.. McKee Adams.. The Struggle 2l the ~ with Hell-
enism. In his theSis Dr. Adams carefully and exhaustively 
traces the conflict between the Jews and lUHlenism back to 
its sources. It is unfortunate that it has not been printed. 
d. i.. !. Swain, "Antiochus Epiphanes and ~gypt.n This is 
one of the outstanding studies on the subject. The author 
carefully investigates Antiochus with regard to Egypt. His 
chief contribution is his emphasis upon the rise of the 
forces of orientalism throughout the Eastern part of the 
Hellenistic world. 
III. ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE DISSERTATION. 
Chapter Two will re concerned with the historical 
background of the immediately preceeding period of Seleucid 
history. The policy of Antiochus III the Great, bis eastern 
campaign, his relations with Rome and the results of Magnesia 
are necessary to a proper understanding of the events in 
Epiphanes'day. The reign of Seleucus IV, Antiochus Epiphanes' 




Chapter Three will lay the immediate background for 
the productive period of Antiochus Epiphanes' life. It will 
trace the influences of his life as a hostage at Rome; his 
period of Hellenic influence during his stay at Athens; the 
method by which he succeeded to the throne, first as regent 
for his nephew, and later as sole ruler. It will be necess-
ary to include an analysis of Antiochus' character in order 
to understand properly his life. A brief survey of the 
economic and social conditions of the Seleucid realm will 
conclude the chapter and complete the necessary background 
to a proper understanding of the reign of Epiphanes. 
Chapters Four and Five will be concerned with the 
reign of Antiochus. The Fourth Chapter will quickly survey 
the Policy of Antiochus, the Egyptian War and the affairs in 
the East in the light of the latest information available 
with occasional corrections by the author in the light of 
the sources as he can best evaluate them. 
The Fifth Chapter will confine itself to the Pales-
tinian Jewish problem. A very brief summary of the post-
exilic history of the Jews will be followed by an investiga-
tion of the Hellenizing policy of Antiochus. The policy of 
Hellenization of the Jews will then be discussed and the 
results of the clash between the two forces set forth. 
A Sixth and final Chapter will be devoted to a Summary 


















The year 221 B.C. saw three young rulers, Philip V, 
Ptolemy IV Philopator and Antiochus III, upon the thrones of 
the three hellenistic monarchies of Macedonia, Egypt and 
Syria. Philip was a popular ruler, "the darling of Hellas." 
It looked as though he might unite the Greeks. In 215 after 
a naval brush with the Romans had forced him out of the 
Adriatic he allied himself with Carthage, hoping for help 
from their fleet. The Romans invoked the aid of Aetolia 
against Philip. Having thus blocked the fleet of Philip, 
while deeply involved with Carthag_e, Rome left the fighting 
in Greece to the Aetolians. Rome then made peace with 
Philip in 205. Aetolla being left to its own devices was 
forced to make asgraceful an exit from the war as was poss-
ible under the circumstances. l 
I. ANTIOCHUS III, THE GREAT 
1. His policy. Ptolemy III had allowed the Egyptian army to 
deteriorate. Antiochus, the energetic and ambitious young 
ruler of Syria saw this condition as his opportunity to restore 











the empire of his ancestor Seleucus I. This seemed to have 
been his life's ambition. 2 
He had neither attempted to make conquests in India 
nor to take possession of defeated Egypt, but had 
risked and finally suffered war with Rome for the 
sake of a few cltie~ in Thrace because they had be-
longed to Seleucus. . 
But that is to get ahead of the story. Antiochus determined 
to take advantage of the weakness of Egypt and wrest Asia 
Minor and Palestine from his young, indolent, inattentive 
and art-loving contemporary.4 In this however Antiochus had 
reckoned without the ability of Sosibius, the Egyptian gen-
eral, who held the Syrian off with his Palestinian fortress-
es until a mercenary army of Greeks could be assembled. The 
Egyptians also opened a ~andora's box of future troubles for 
themselves in that they armed the natives and sent them into 
the battle. This turned the tide for Egypt but the expedient 
cost the ptolemies endless trouble, for the natives learned 
that they could fight and beat a Greek army. The native 
revolts thereafter kept the country in constant strife.5 
a. The Battle !1 Raphia. At Raphia just north of the 
Egyptian border in 217 the armies met. Antiochus leading 
2. Bactria, p. 189. 
3. Loc. cit. 
-
4. Polby., 5:34; Cf. 14:11,12. 














the cavalry charged against the Egyptian left wing commanded 
by Philopator. Be won this conflict but instead of turning 
his force against the enemy center or the left wing, he led 
the cavalry in a foolhardy pursuit of the fleeing Egyptians. 
The Egyptian forces left on the field on their part were 
successful and when Antiochus returned he found the bulk of 
his army beaten. Ptolemy did nothing to follow up this 
decisive victory but rettred to Egypt and gave himself up to 
drunken reveling. Be did not even attempt to retake Seleucia .. 
in Pieria which Antiochus had captured in 219. 6 
b. In! "Anabasis." The defeat at Raphia did not dishearten 
young Antiochus. Be justified himself by feeling that if the 
whole army had foUlbt as well as he' had, the battle would have 
been' won. 7 Be considered the reverse as temp.orary and set 
about restoring his empire with youthful vigor. His cousin, 
Archaeus was in charge of affairs in Asia Minor. Archaeus 
gave evidence that he was playing the role of independent 
king. Antiochus attacked him energetically and finally one 
of his friends, Bolis by name, betrayed, him into Antiochus' 
hands. 8 After three years of fighting in alliance with 
Pergamum, Asia Minor was pacified. Antiochus then began his 
"Anabasis" in the East. Bis strategy was not to reconquer 
6. Polby. 5:82ff. 








Parthia and Bactria, both of which had revolted, but to re-
establish the Seleucid authority among the eastern Satraps. 
This successful campaign was widely heralded as a duplica-
tion of the feat of Alexander and the title "Great King" 
was bestowed upon him. His prestige among his subjects and 
outside his kingdom was greatly enhanced by his success in 
this venture. 9 
2. TreatI with Philip V. Antiochus, the Great, still had 
his heart set on the conquest of Egypt but did not dare to 
move South with a possible hostile Philip behind him. There-
fore after the death of Philopator he invited Philip to 
share the foreign provinces of Ptolemy with him, and they 
signed the treaty in the winter of 203-202 whi!ch so ,shocked 
PolYbius. lO They hoped that Egypt torn by a revolt of the 
natives would not be able to offer much resistance. ll 
a. Second Ma£edoai~ !!t. The brutal conduct of Philip 
following this notorious treaty induced Rhodes and Pergamum 
to call upon Rome for help thus bringing the disastrous 
Second Kacedonian War upon him.12 While Rome was busy with 
Philip, Antiochus set about the conquest of the coast of 
Asia Minor and the annexation of Palestine and Phoenicia. 
9. !l.!. , pp. 49-50. 
10. Polyb. 15:20. 
11. !!.!. , p. 51; Cf. Supra, p. 15. 









Ptolemy's general Scopus wrested Judea away from Antiochus 
in 199 but at Panium, near the headwaters of the Jordan, 
Scopus was finally defeated the next year and 122 years of 
Ptolemaic rule of the eastern approaches to Egypt was at 
end. 13 This was an economic blow, for this territory because 
of its control of the eastern trade routes had been a 
necessary part of the economy of Egypt. 
b. Roman Attitude toward Antiochus III. Following their 
victory over Philip at Cynoscephelae, the Romans sent L. 
Cornelius Lentulus and three others to Antiochus for a 
"determined assault on the king." They sought to pose as 
protectors of Ptolemy V. Antiochus made the announcement 
that he had already made peace with Egypt, that Egypt had 
renounced all her Syrian, Asiatic and Thracian dependencies 
and that his daughter, Cleopatra, was betrothed to Ptolemy. 
Holleaux concludes, "he made the Romans look extremely 
foolish."14 This piece of statesmanship removed the Roman 
pretext for interference and the new territory remained in 
the hands of Antiochus. 
Rome was wearied by her wars with Carthage and Mace-
donia and had her hands full in Spain. The party of Cato 
was opposed to extending her responsibilities in the East 
13. Ibid., 16:39. 







because of the debilitating influence of the East upon the 
Romans which be considered corrupting.15 There was no 
immediate clamor in Rome for war with AntiochuS. 16 Deep 
in the heart of Rome however was a fear of the Eastern pow-
ers with their great military tradition. Alexander had 
probably entertained ambitions in the West. His successors 
had been ambitious men and Phyrrus had even fought and 
defeated Rome on Italian soil. The defeat of Philip left 
the power of Antiochus as the threat which Rome feared. 
Rostovtzeff concludes, 
We are therefore not surprised to find that the 
Romans after the Second Kacedonian war gradually 
but systematically made war with Antiochus in-
evitable, though Antiochus tried by every means 
to avoid it (193 B.C.). They wanted to weaken 
the great Oriental conqueror while they were on 
more or less good terms with Greece and before 
Philip was willing and prepared to cooperate 
with him.17 
Although Rome did not at first seem to desire war 
and Antiochus did all in his power to forestall it, 
Eumenes II of Pergamum and the Aetolians did want war. 
EWLeues sought to regain bis power in Asia Minor while the 
Aetolians sought revenge upon Rome for what they considered 
her betrayal at the close of the Second Macedonian War. 18 
15. H. H. Scullard, ~. Cit., p. 278. 
16. Hel. eiv., pp. 23,4. 
17. Ii·!·, p. 55. 




3. War with Rome. 
---
a. In Bellas. Rome sent Antiochus an ultimatum regarding 
the Thracian cities in 193. Although he had not made 
sufficient preparation for war Antiochus in March of the 
next year accepted the Aetolean invitation to "liberate 
Greece. n19 Be sought to unite all the Greeks in a struggle 
against Rome. Be landed 10,000 men at Demetrias (a large 
enough army to start a war but insufficient to fight one) and 
waited in expectation that all the Greeks would join him. 
The Aetolians fough~ bravely, but Philip could not forget his 
grudge against the Aetolians, and the Achaean League along 
with Philip supported Rome. Ere long his unsupported force 
was caught by his enemies and cut to pieces at the old death 
trap, Thermopolae. 20 
b. In~. The Romans saw that it would be unsafe for 
them to ignore Antiochus this juncture. They gathered a 
large army in 189 under the leadership of L. Cornelius 
Scipio, who was .accompanied by his brother Africanus, the 
conqueror of Carthage, and sent it into Asia. An~iochus 
superstitiously thought his fortune had forsaken him. He 
failed to make a stand at the Hellespont and soon thereafter 
his army was destroyed at Magnesia. 
19. Po1yb. 20:8; Livy 36:19:11. 








c. bIDall 2t ~ !m:. The treaty of Apamea which followed 
in 188 was disastrous for Antiochus. The Romans demanded 
that: 21 
1. Antiochus retire from Europe and all of Asia Minor 
West of the Taurus. 
2. An indemnity of 15,000 Euboian talents was to be 
paid to Rome, 500 at once, 2500 upon the ratification of the 
peace by the people of Rome, and twelve yearly payments of 
1000 talents each. 
3. Antiochus give up his fleet and his war elephants 
promising to limit his navy to ten ships and to cease the 
use of elephants in the army. 
4. Antiochus surrender Hannibal and certain other 
political refugees. 
5. Antiochus pay Eumenes the 400 talents he owed him 
and likewise furnish some grain promised Eumenes tby Antiochus, 
the Great. 
6. Twenty hostages be given to guarantee the fulfillme~ 
of the treaty by Antiochus. 
Rome thus became the dominant force in Asia. Sbe never 
allowed the Syrian kingdom to recuperate. Assassinations, 
confusion and quarrels with~n the kingdom and the royal 
21. Polyb. 21:17; Livy 37:35:3. The formal treaty 










house ensued and Rome always supported the elements of 
disruption. 22 
Henceforth the Hellenistic World ceased to be a 
political unit. Rostovtzeff says, 
I have already insisted upon this unity and expressed 
my conviction that unless the Hellenistic world is 
treated as a single whole, its political development 
in the third century B.C. can hardly be fully under-
stood. The Roman intervention put an end to this 
unity. No doubt there were still dipaomatic rela-
tions between the various kingdoms and cities, 
dynastic marriages were still used as political 
weapons and were very popular among the Greeks ••• 
but all this was now of very little importance. Rome 
through her agents, expecially the Pergamene kings, 
kept a watchful eye on these relations and would not 
tolerate even the possibility of a real rapprochement 
between the important Hellenistic powers. 
In fact the Hellenistic world was now split into 
three groups, which were in no direct contact with 
each other: Macedonia and Greece formed one group, 
Asia Minor another, Syria and Egypt the third. 23 
. Syria remained independent but with her fleet gone 
and the most hellenized part of .her empire lost, she was 
doomed to become by degrees an Oriental state. Antiochus 
only lived a year after Apamea. He was killed in 187 while 
attacking a temple state in Elymais.24 He had been so weak-
ened that he was unable to entertain any hope of revenge. 
22. Bevan, CAB VIII, 495· 
23. ~. World, pp. 55,6. 
24. Strabo·16:l:18. 
22 
.11. SELEUCUS IV 
Antiochus the Great married Laodice, the daughter of 
Mithradates. 25 They had six children that are known to us. 
All of them became important figures in history. The eldest 
son, Antiochus,was associated with his father in the govern-
ment from 208 until his death. This younger Antiochus was 
married to his sister, Laodice. Bis untimely death in 192 
made Seleucus the next in line for the succession at the age 
of 30 years. Other daughters were Cleopatra I, "the Syrian," 
who married Ptolemy V, and Antiochis who was later the queen 
of Cappadocia. The other son was a second Antiochus who was 
later to follow his brother in the succession as Antiochus 
IV.26 Seleucus married his sister Laodice, who had previous-
ly been the elder brother's wife. Be had two Sons by her, 
Demetrius, who later succeeded him, and Antiochus with whom 
his uncle Antiochus was later to be associated as regent. 
1. ais Policy. Scant mention is given Seleucus IV in the 
sources. Be did not come to the throne as an untried novice • 
., 
Bouche-Leclercq says that 
La vi~royaut' de Thrace avait fait preuve de 
capacites diplomatiques et militatres au cours de 
la malheureuse guerre engagee par son p~re contre 
les Romains. 
-
25. Polyb. 5:43. 
26. Grace Helen Macurdy, Hellenistic Queens (Balti-







/ " II avait ••• comm~de un corps dtarmee a la 
bataille de Mag~sie.27 
For six years after the death of his elder brother, Anti-
ochus, Seleucus was the heir-apparent to the throne. As 
king his course naturally was not a brilliant one. The 
debacle at Magnesia had effectively doomed any aggressive 
plans for the kingdom. The only sound policy possible was 
to abstain from expensive adventures and thus be able to 
meet the expense of the crushing indemnity. Bevan says that 
Seleucus dealt prudently with the situation. 28 A contempor-
ary opinion of him says, "He caused an exactor to pass 
through the land,"29 indicating the financial strait the 
kingdom was in and the heavy taxes necessary for the payment 
of the Roman indemnity. The exactor was doubtless the chief 
minister, Heliodorus, whom II Maccabees connects with an 
attempt to rob the temple at Jerusalem.30 
Outside of his dominions Seleucus followed the policy 
of peace at any price. "" Bouche-Leclercq calls attention to a 
fragment of Diodorus which says that Seleucus prepared to 
cross the Taurus in aid of Pharnace in his war with Eumenes 
II of Pergamum but upon consideration of his realm's relation 
27. Bouch'-Leclercq, Histoite de Seleucides (paris: 
1914), p. 227. 
28. CAB VIII 494f. 
29. paniel 11:20. 
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24 
to Rome nil renounce a son entreprise. n31 Seleucus probably 
began the policy which his brother so ably augmented--the 
strengthening of the Greek element within the empire. 32 
He was on friendly terms with the Achaean League and furthur 
kept his interest in Greek affairs by giving his daughter to 
Perseus of Macedon in 177.33 This was a great event. The 
Rhodian navy sent a guard of honor to escort the princess to 
her new home. Rome of course was suspicious and nfirent 
retomber leur mauvaise humeur sur les Rhodiens. n34 Reuter 
maintains that Seleucus sought to create a Panhellenistic 
alliance against Rome, but one is inclined to agree when 
Rostovtzeff says the evidence is too scanty to support this 
view. 35 
2. Attitude 2f EgYpt. Egypt again began to take an aggressive 
attitude toward Syria after the disaster at Magnesia. The 
Egyptians had offered their support to Rome in the campaign 
,', 
against Antiochus III. Eumenes II of Pergamum had been given 
most of Asia after the war but Egypt had received nothing-not 
even Coele-Syria. Polycrates the military leader of Egypt 
31. ~ 231. Bouche-Leclercq, Q:Q.. QU., p. 
32. Bactria, p. 186. 
33. Polyb. 25: 4:8-10. 
34. / Bouche-Leclercq, QE.. Qil.., p. 235. 






decided that the time to regain this province had come. The 
sudden death of Ptolemy V however precluded this effort. 
Cleopatra, his wife, became regent for the boy' Philometer. 
Although she had transfered her loyalties to Egypt she did 
not pursue the war with Syria which had been contemplated. 36 
Seleucus IV's career was cut short while he was yet 
in his early forties. The chief minister, Heliodorus, 
murdered the king in order that he might rule in his stead. 37 
No details of this event are known. 
C'est pour" avoir ainsi compris son tale et s'y ~e 
tenu que Seleucos IV reste une figure un peu effac~e 
entre son p~e, "le Grand" it son fr~" .. "l'Illustre" 
••• ~ tout cas, il ne laissait pas dechoir la 
dignit~ royal; il amintent le culte de~~es anc1tres 
et le sien, do~dfun flamine sp'cial.~8 
36. Bevan, Egypt, pp. 273, 282. 
37. App. Syr. 45. 
,; 38. Bouche-Leclercq, ~. Qi1., p. 228. 
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THE RISE TO POWER OF ANTIOCHUS IV 
Antiochus III married a princess-Laodice, the daughter 
of Mithradates, king of Pontus, who himself had married a 
Laodice, the sister of Seleucus II. Thus the wife of Anti-
ochus III was his first cousin. The royal couple had six 
children. The age of all the children is not known but Epi-
phanes was the third son, the second with the name Antiochus. 
One wonders how they managed to identify the different boys 
and one's wonder is increased by the knowledge that one of 
the girls was named Antiochis. l 
I. EARLY LIFE 
As a lad Antiochus could entertain little hope of 
ever reigning as successor to his father. His elder brother, 
Antiochus, was associated with his father as early as 208 
2 
according to the Babylonian records. Upon his brother's 
demise the next eldest brother, Seleucus became the heir-
apparent, and Antiochus' position remained essentially un-
changed. 
1. Supra, 23. 
2. Clay, Babllonian Eecords in .:the illr.ary Qf ~ir­
pont Morgan, II, p. 13, Morgan Library Collection, 2171, 
cited by Grace H. Macurdy, Hellenistic Queens (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1932), p. 91. 
27 
The young man was sent to Rome following the 
Roman victory at Magnesia as one of the twenty hostages. 3 
As to the length of his stay in Rome, most authorities say 
that he was there thirteen or fourteen years. Tarn's 
conjecture4 would imply that Antiochus remained in Rome from 
the time of his father's defeat at Magnesia until the death 
of Seleucus. Be takes up the whole period with the Roman 
visit. Consideration must be made of the time necessary to 
travel from Rome to Athens and from Athens to Syria by way 
of Pergamum. Be resided at Athens long enough to attain the 
office of general and was in office long enough for coins 
to be struck which bear his name. 5 No doubt it took time 
also for Antiochus to complete his negotiations with the 
Pergamene kings and prepare the Asian army for the invasion 
of Syria. One is led to conclude that about two years before 
Seleucus was killed, Demetrius was sent to replace his uncle 
at Rome; Antiochus, realizing that a younger brother was a 
poor insurance risk in the court of an oriental despot, 
settled down in the "healthy" climate of Athens and there 
occupied his energies as one of the chief magistrates of 
Athens until he was interrupted by. the news of this brother's 
death. 
3. App. §yr., 39; Buprth pp. 21,2. 
4. Bel. Civ., p. 30. Tarn says he spent fourteen 
years in Rome. 








AS a hostage at Rome the young prince was separated 
from the usual cortege of eunuchs and flattering courtiers 
which would have dominated his environment had he lived in 
the east. The ordered freedom and the political morality of 
the Republic were the admiration of the Greek wo~ld of that 
day.6 In Rome he circulated in a republican atmosphere 
where he was treated as an equal. Be was well received by 
the young Roman aristocracy and became intimate with many.7 
The unceremonious freedom and the undignified familiarity of 
Rome left its stamp upon him. On the less desirable side, 
nil avait vecu au milieu d'une soci~te prematurement cor-
rumpue, ou l'hypocrisie remplacait la vertu, en attendant 
que Ie vice put sty etaler librement."8 One can imagine 
that a young man of his energy and intellect would seek to 
discover the sources of strength in the. Colossus to the west 
which had toppled his father's kingdom as easily as Alexan-
der had conquered the same territory. The Roman influence 
was strongest during the first five years of his reign. Be 
6. Bouse S~l~ p. 128. 
7. Livy 42:6; Justin 34:3:2. 
8. Bouch~Leclercq, Bistoire des Seleucids (paris: 
1913), p. 245. Swain (pp. 90 ff.), draws an unlovely picture 
of the political scene in Rome about this time. Be outlines 
in detail the rise of a new aristocratic clique and speaks ~ 





loved to toy with the political institutions of the Republic 
and even played at running for office and acting in the 
capacity of an elected officia1. 9 This was na passing phase 
which culminated in the building of a temple at Antioch to 
Jupiter capitolinus. nlO One wonders whether in all this 
Antiochus was not playing a part, hoping to convince the 
Senate that he would be subservient to them. 
2. A1 Athens. Antiochus stopped at Athens "on his way home" 
from Rome. His standing, liberality and pleasing personality 
won for him the good will of the citizens there. His popu-
larity was so great that he was elected to be General of the 
Hoplites. Bevan cites an inscription which "is believed to 
be a copy of a decree passed by the Athenian people thanking 
Eumenes for having set their late general upon the throne of 
his fathers. nIl There are extant coins issued by Athens with 
the Athenian Owl and Antiochus' name associated with the 
name of two other officials. The characteristic Seleucid 
symbol, the elephant, assures the identification.12 This 
9. Polyb. 26:1. 
10. Bactria, p. 186; Livy 40:20. 
11. CAR VIII, p. 497; OGIK, 248 
12. BMC, Attica p. 36, No. 328, Pl. xi. 1. Silver 
Attic tetradrachm, 16·7 grammes. Cf. Bill, Historical Greek 
Coins (London:1906), pp. 140-43, in support of the elephant 
badge as characteristicly Seleucid. Prof. L. L. Howe, QJ- Q~Qf 
L. Bist. Dept. told the writer in conversationnOn,::some of the 
specimens the features of the goddess Athens on the ob~erse 
(to me at least), -very strongly resemble Antiochus." 
I 30 
coin established Antiochus t Athenian citizenship and his 
position as an official. 
3. Seizure 2f ~ throne. During Antiochus t residence in 
Athens, Seleucus was assassinated by Heliodorus, one of the 
court officers. Hl3 Eumenes II of Pergamus aided Antiochus 
in gaining the throne by setting him at the head of the Per-
gamene army.14 Seeing his substantial backing the opposition 
melted away_ The well known loyalty of the Greeks for the 
royal house made it easy no doubt for Antiochus to overcome 
even Heliodorus, who as an established public administrator 
had doubtless entrenched his administration of national 
affairs well in view of the coming coup.d'etat.15 
Antiochus Epiphanes at first ruled as regent for his 
13. App. Syr., 45. 
14. Appian, Loc. cit., says that Eumenes, now suspicious 
of Rome saw this as his opportunity to gain the friendship of 
Syria. Rome would be expected to favor Antiochus, the Romanized 
Prince, to either of Selucus t sons or a Syrian usurper who 
was an unknown quantity, says Bouch€-Leclercq, 2£. Cit. Swain 
pp. 78,9 says, Hmodern writers gravely misrepresent his (Eumenes~, character and importance when they dtpict him as a 
mere "lackey" of Rome. H He had recognized Romets military 
might and was scheming to use it for his own purposes--the 
promotion of Greek culture and life. Another reason for 
supporting Antiochus was that Eumenes II could not allow a 
regicide in an adjoining kingdom to go unpunished or· rule in 
unmolested peace. 
~ 15. OGIS, 247. Heliodorus was a citizen of Antioch and 
a (J"UVT,IUlq,oS of the king, Q.n!. having been brought Bl? with 
the ..;-oyal ~hildren. One might surmise that he possibly 
planned to bulwark his authority by marrying Laod1ce (Cf. p. 
23), and then declaring himself regent for her younger son 
by Seleucus IV, Ant1ochus. 
31 
infant nephew, Antiochus, as regent. The hypothesis that he 
married his sister Laodice to secure possession of her child 
16 is now generally accepted. Coins were later issued with 
no change save the substitution of the portrait of Epiphanes 
for that of the boy Antiochus. 17 The numismatic evidence is 
confirmed by Cuneiform documents for the years 175-169 which 
bear the dating nAntiochus and Antiochus Kings. n18 This 
change in conception would make the child Antiochus IV, and 
Epiphanes would become Antiochus V. The time honored order 
has not been replaced however because of the disruption and 
misunderstanding such a course would produce. 
At the time of the accession of Antiocbus Epiphanes, 
his nephew Demetrius, the legal heir to the throne was in 
Rome as a hostage for his father. Be was forced to remain 
there as hostage for his usurping uncle.19 A contemporary 
account described Epiphanes as nA contemptible person, on 
whom the royal dignity has not been conferred, but who shall 
come by stealth and shall win the kingdom by intrigues. n20 
16. Thus she was married to all three of her brothers 
in succession--Antiochus, Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV 
Epiphanes. 
/' 17. CAB Plates Vol. III, pp. 12, 13; Bouche-Leclercq, 
Qj!. Cit., P:-24t>. 
18. QA§ VIII, p. 498. 
19. Polyb. 31: 2,11; Zonaris 9:25; .App. Syr., 45. 





As Demetrius was but a child, perhaps eleven or twelve 
years of age, it was fortunate for the realm that a strong 
hand was on the helm. 
4. Epiphanes sole ruler. In the year 170 Antiochus was in 
Cilicia subduing an uprising. Andronicus was managing the 
kingdom in his absence. For some reason he had the young 
Antiochus destroyed. At 'the same time Andronicus killed 
Onias III, the exiled ex-high-priest of the Jews. 21 Coins 
thereafter born the image of Antiochus as king indicating 
that he assumed complete authority over the kingdom at that 
time. 
II. PERSONALITY OF ANTIOCHUS 
The reputation of Antiochus Epiphanes preceeds him 
wherever his name is mentioned. His name is the symbol for 
pitiless persecution and oriental despotism at its worst. 
In a large measure this prejudice can be attributed to the 
-
21. Diod. Sic. 30:7:2. Andronicus was put to death 
by Epiphanes when he returned (Cf. II Macc 4:37,8). 
Although the older sources are unfriendly to Antiochus 
Epiphanes, none of them say that the king had the boy put 
out of the way. Bevan thinks that Andronicus would hardly 
have killed the boy if he had not believed Antiochus would 
have been glad (CAB VIII, 504). The murder of the boy 
however would have had little motive on Antiochus f part 
because Demetrius, the legitimate heir was yet alive and 
in Rome. The early coins and inscriptions do prove that 
the child lived for some years and was not destroyed as 







early historians. The Jews considered him as the enemy of 
their natioa.and its faith. The Romans likewise were un-
friendly. The result is that the uncritical reader finds 
only an unsympathetic picture of the man revealed. If all 
the evil things said about Antiochus were true, he would 
indeed hardly be worthy of the bottom-most reaches of perdi-
tion. Daniel speaks of him as "A contemptible person. • • 
who shall come by stealth and shall win the country by in-
trigues ••• he shall practice treachery.,,22!he chief 
characterization of I Maccabees is summed up in the word 
arrogance. Jason of Cyrene childishly complained, accusing 
Antiochus of "thinking in his arrogance that he would make 
the land navigable and the sea traversable on foot, he was so 
intoxicated in mind. n23 Polybius tried to overcome a strong 
personal bias against the enemy of Egypt and the usurper of 
his friend Demetrius' kingdom, but he 'said that Antiochus' 
virtue broke down in the face of temptation and that he 
attacked Egypt in the face of all his promises. 24 Ling said 
some thought he was "undoubtedly mad".25 Down through history 
the Jew has never forgiven Antiochus. Bevan has continued 
the charge that he was a superficial nBohemian" who allowed 
22. Daniel 11:21-3. 
23. ll~· 5:21. 
24. Polby. 28:18. 
25. ~ 21:20. 
, 
34 
the external glories of hellenism to possess his mind.26 
Otto has painted a brilliant picture of a half-mad 
hysterical king who was the grave-digger of his empire.27 
It is surprising to discover in contrast to such evil 
reports that even antagonistic sources have been forced to 
speak praise of the Syrian. Livy concedE that Antiochus 
had a truly kingly spirit with regard to his munificence to 
cities and his care for divine worship. He says that Antio-
chus! magnificent public spectacles surpassed those of all 
other klngs.28 Polybius also mentions these qualities and 
further congratula~ him, describing his conduct of the 
Egyptian was as nenergetic, daring in deSign, and worthy of 
the royal dignity.n29 Appian, who is the most objective 
source, called him spirited and illustrious and averred 
that he governed with a firm hand. 30 The greatest compliment 
paid the king's capacity is the statement of Appian that the 
Roman Senate rejoiced at his death, and then, and only then, 
dared to enforce the terms of the treaty of ApameB by 
destroying the. military power of Syria which Antiochus had 
rebuilt so well. 3l 
26. House Sel., 131. 
27. otto. QQ. Cit., p. 84. 
28. Livy 41:20. 
29. Po1yb. 28:18. 
30. App. Syr., 45:6. 
31. Loc. Cit. 
--
35 
To the writers of all ages the king has been an enigma. 
Even when they make statements in praise of him they inevit-
ably end on a harsh note. There seemed to be so many contra-
dictory elements in his nature. Be was an oriental monarch; 
yet he played at being elected to republican office and then 
acted the part of a Roman judge in the market place. 32 He 
played pranks on his highest courtiers and was effusive in 
his hospitality to utter strangers. 33 Be wandered through 
the city of Antioch with but one or two companions and was 
often found in the shops of the 'goldsmiths and silversmiths, 
its world famed artizans.34 He invited the world to his 
celebration at Daphne which outshone the Roman triumph of 
Amelius Paulus and then played the fool throughout. 35 What 
did he mean? 
Modern psychologists would pronounc him an insecure 
personality. His insecurity had been fostered from childhood. 
Intensely ambitious he was born the third son of an oriental 
monarch with all expectation of future power precluded by 
his two older brothers. Pampered in his youth, son of a 
32. Polyb. 26:1; Athen. 5:193f.; Livy 41:20. 
33. Ibid. 
34. ~. 




father who had won great renown as a conqueror, his early 
manhood was spent as a hostage for a father who had been 
ignominiously defeated. At Rome everything was foreign to 
him. He was not even a citizen, whereas he had been the son 
of a king. Finally when he came to his kingdom it was with 
the help of an hereditary enemy, and at first he was only 
regent for his infant nephew. 36 Physicially he was menaced 
by the malady which was to later shorten his career so disas-
trously.37 Above all the king of the richest country in the 
world was forced into an obsequious abasement before Rome 
which culminated in the stinging insult of Eleusis. It is 
little wonder that the king had difficulty in adjusting him-
self. What so many have overlooked is that he overcame hiS 
problems and became a strong ruler--one of the strongest in 
a strong family. 
A final summary of his character as king would follow 
this order. There was no doubt that he had a good mind in 
spite of his mad pranks. The burning ambition of the house 
of Seleucus dominated his career. These characteristics were 
augmented by the personal charm and imagination which made 
36. Supra., pp. 33,4. 
37. Bactria p. 215, n.; App. Syr., 66 says he died of 
consumption; a disease which does not kill quickly, Cf. 




him a perfect diplomat although his ethics were not of the 
highest order (a factor which would enhance his usefulness 
as a diplomat in any period of history). His training in 
Rome stimulated his gregarious tendencies and he never was 
able to accept the restraints of court etiquette. Be liked 
people and sought their company_ He manifested a personal 
irtterest in the work of the world-famed artizans of his 
capitol city, he talked with lowly strangers, he bathed in 
the public baths and enjoyed his practical jokes upon his 
fellows there. 38 It is almost pathetic to picture him as he 
came uninvited to banquets or entertainments seeking enjoy-
ment and company only to have the guests become so abashed 
in his presence that they shyly departed leaving the king 
alone. 39 One must not overlook his vigorous energy nor his 
perfect mastery of himself as he met his enemies so suavely 
in diplomatic encounters that he made the Romans think that 
he enjoyed their c~ude oppression. He was a savage oriental 
in punishing the rebellious. Be undoubtedly blundered in 
pressing his campaign in Egypt as he also blundered in his 
relations with the Jews. Antiochus personally had little 
to do with the Jewish problem. Be sought to punish the 
recalcitrant and the rebellious but the undoubted savagery 
38. Polyb., 26:1:12-14.= Athen. 10:439a; Cf. Li~ 41:20. 















of the religious persecution of the Jews was perhaps the 
work of subordinates who were influenced by the desire on 
the part of the Greeks and hellenizing Jews of the city of 
Antioch (Jerusale~, to stamp out the unhellenized Jews. 40 
All in all however he appears before us as a strong vigorous 
ruler who Tarn says could have changed the history of the 
world had he not died so soon.41 
III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
1. Territory. The loss of Asia Minor west of the Taurus by 
Antiochus III was a blow to the kingdom. Much of the loss 
however was compensated for the addition of Southern Syria 
and Palestine to the kingdom of Egypt's expense. The king-
dom as it came to Epiphanes was shorn of one third of its 
territory. Antiochus III had gained the title ngreat king" 
for his successful expedition in the east, but MagneSia 
had dissipated his control there. The ancient Satrapy of 
Parthia not only recovered her independence but was now 
reaching out to the Caspian Gates. Demetrius of Bactria had 
annexed the Seleucid provinces east of the Persian desert. 42 
What had been the ancient kingdoms of Assyria and Babylon 
4fT. 
41. Bactri~ p. 215. 









was now more than ever the core of the empire and further-
more this section was not vulnerable to the Romans. Syria, 
Phoenicia and Palestine became the western borders of the 
empire. 
2. frosperitI. Syria was not ruined by the losses at Apamea. 
Its prosperity was not even seriously undermined. The wealth 
of Southern Syria probably surpassed that of Asia Minor. 43 
The indemnity following Antiochus the Great's defeat, of 
course, made for a difficult financial situation, no matter 
how temporary. One result was the rigid curtailment of the 
ambitious political and military enterprises in which Anti-
ochus the Great had been so completely immersed. 
The Seleucids even at this time could probably be said 
to be the wealthiest kings in the world.44 Justification for 
this statement is seen in the following financial achievements. 
1. Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV were able to pay the 
enormous tribute to Rome of 15,000 talents in thirteen years. 
2. Antiochus made large and munificent gifts to many 
cities in the Greek world.45 
J. Syria maintained a large and well equipped army and 
Epiphanes was able to conduct an expensive war in Egypt. 
43. a.w., pp. 695. 
44. ~.!., 703. "The Seleucids wbo succeeded Antiochus 
III ••• were still enormously wealthy, probably more so than 
their Egyptian rivals. 




4. The enormous wealth displayed in the festival at 
Daphne manifested the wealth of Syria.46 
J. Economic resources. The land and especially in Southern 
Syria and Palestine produced a great variety of commodities 
of good quality. Agriculture was in a flourishing condition 
with enough production to supply the domestic needs and also 
provide a surplus for export. Posidonius says, "and all the 
people of Syria because of the great plenty which their land 
afforded. were relieved of any distress regarding the necess-
aries of life" and therefore lived as in a continuous feast. 47 
The industries of the kingdom are well known. The 
textiles of Babylon, the dye stuffs of Phoenicia, the glass-
ware of Tyre and Sidon were famous. The unguents, scented 
oils and perfumes of the world were largely produced in this 
territory. The prodigality of the kings of Syria in their 
expenditure of precious ointment is well known. 48 Pottery 
from the country was exported throughout the world of that 
day. Especially were the Syrians famed for their work in 
adorning their glassware with precious metals and gems. 
Syria stood very high in the realm of the toreutic arts. 
46. Polyb 30:25ff. 
47. Quoted by M. Rostovtzeff, H. !., p. 697. 
48. Polyb. ~. Q!1. 
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4. International trad!. The wealth of Syria made her prom-
inent in the world of trade. Political and commercial rela-
tions were especially close between Rhodes and Syria. An 
illustration of this is the naval escort furnished by the 
Rhodians to conduct the daughter of Seleucus IV Philopator 
on her way to Macedonia to become the bride of Perseus. 
There were many Syrians at Rhodes. That city in conjunction 
with Ephesus and Miletus, became the clearing house for Syrian 
goods and trade. The great overland caravan routes connect-
ing the Greece-Italian world with Arabia, India and China 
all passed through the Seleucid realm enrighing it thereby. 
The Euphrates route, the West Arabian route, the Chinese 
"silk route" and the land routes of the Indian trade all 
traversed Selucid territory. 
Some violent methods of public finance were resorted 
to in this period of financial difficulty. This subject will 
be treated in a subsequent chapter.49 Suffice it to say here 
that the wealth of the many temples within the realm was 
tremendous. These hardy realists of course could be counted 
upon to. draw from these resources when emergencies such as 
the Roman indemnity arose • 
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5. Resulting policX. Itis not surprising in the light 
of the financial strength of the empire to note that Syria 
never surrendered her political aspirations or hopes for 
recovery and consolidation of the empire after the debacle 
at Magnesia. Seleucus IV was nl'ennemi sournois et 
irreconciliable de Rome n50 Antiochus Epiphanes was anxious 
to enlarge and consolidate his empire and made vigorous 
efforts in that direction. 
50. Cf. p. 49. 
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THE REIGN OF ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES 
EGYPT AND THE EAST 
The policy of Epiphanes for the first five years was 
the same as that inaugurated by his father after Magnesia, 
and which his brother Seleucus had steadfastly adhered to. 
This policy was one of adherence to the treaty of Apamea, 
avoidance of friction with Rome, strenuous efforts to pay 
the huge Roman indemnity and peace at any price. They also 
strengthened the Greek element in the empire by founding 
cities which were centers of Greek culture. 
The year 169 saw a great change in the policy of Epi-
phanes. There were several contributory factors to this 
change. The Third Macedonian War had begun two years before 
and Perseus was somewhat sutcessful during the first phases 
of that conflict. War with Egypt seemed to be forced upon 
Syria by the machinations of the two advisors of young 
Ptolemy VI Philometor, Eulaeus and Lenaeus. The sudden 
death of the boy Antiochus, while Epiphanes was in Cilicia 
suddenly placed the uncle in complete authority. Perhaps 
the most important single factor in the change of policy on 
the part of Epiphanes may have been that he had been veiling 






to seek openly the fulfillment of his ambitions. The Roman 
indemnity was paid. A new generation of soldiers was now 
ready to fill the ranks of the army. The finances of the 
nation had recuperated materially. The king was ready, 
Symptoms of disintegratian were calling for the king's 
vigorous attention. 
The most important was the steady orientalization of 
the Empire. It found its expression in many and 
various phenomena. 
One was the gradual transformation of the Greek 
mentality of the Greek settlers in the Seleucid Emp-
ire. They became in spirit, religion, and life more 
Oriental. Another was the rise of national spirit 
among the Oriental subjects of thelSeleucids--the 
Arabs, the Jews, and the Iranians. 
otto says, 
So richtig an sich sein Gedanke gewesen war, gegen-
uber dem vordringenden Orient wieder energisch die 
Hellenischierungspolitik der ersten Seleukiden auf-
zunehmen, das hellenische Element in seinem Reich 
auf jede Weise zu starken, und durch den Hellenismus 
das auseinanderfallende Reich wieder fester zusammen-
aufassen, so abwegig war der Gedanke suf dem Wege des 
Dekretierens eine volle Uniformierung der volkisch so 
verschiedenartigen Elemente des Reiches gerade in 
einer Zeit der Wiedererweckung des bodenstandigen 
Elements herzustellen. 2 
Rome was determined to undermine the strength of the kingdom 
at every turn. In the East and the South the former depend-
encies were increasingly powerful--Parthia, Bactria, Armenia 
1. H.W., p. 63. 
2. W. Otto, Zur Geschicte ~ Zeit des ~ ptolemaers. 







and the Nabataean kingdom. 
I. ANTIOCHUS' POLICY 
Rostovtzeff contends that there is not sufficient 
evidence to sustain the theory that Seleucus IV Philopator 
attempted to create a Panhellenistic alliance against Rome. 3 
Likewise there is no indication that Epiphanes sought to 
Romanize his kingdom and "establish a modus vivendi between 
his Asiatic kingdom and Rome." Tarn has made a strong case 
for the preeminence of the East in the plans of Antiochus in 
opposition to otto, who holds that Antiochus t chief ambition 
was the conquest of Egypt. Tarn's view has been accepted by 
the later writers, Rostovtzeff and Swain. Antiochus thus 
sought to maintain the stat~~ guo in the West in order to 
avoid a second front in the West while he attempted to 
subdue Armenia and Parthia.4 Tarn proves his point to the 
satisfaction of the present writer. This view revolutionizes 
the traditional view of Antiochus t foreign policy and also 
puts a different aspect upon the Jewish revolt. 
1. Qgification of the Kingdom. I Maccabees records Antio-
chus attempt to unify his kingdom. 
3. ~.!., p. 1492,3, n. 125. 





Then the king wrote to ,his whole kingdom that they 
should all become one people, and everyone should 
give up his particular practices. And all the 
heathen assented to the eommand of the king.' 
Be wanted to make the kingdom strong enough to resist any 
designs of the Romans to further weaken his empire by inter-
vening in the internal affairs of the kingdom. Tarn says: 
Antiochus IV knew Rome very well, and, as I see it, 
his eonsistent attitude was that there must be no 
quarrel with her at any price; what was lost in the 
West was lost forever. But the East remained. Rome 
had no concern with the East; a new world could there 
be called into being to redress the'balance of the 
old, and Alexander's empire in Asia, east of the 
boundary which Rome had dictated, might be ~estored 
without any risk of giving offence to Rome. 
Antiochus thought, 
••• the success of Rome was due to her centraliza-
tion, one ruling city and one civilization, and he 
set to work, so1Br as he eould, to carry out the 
same ideas in hi§ own empire, though naturally on 
different lines. 7 
His only hope for unity in his polyglot empire was to make 
Greek civilization eommon to all and to unify the ruling 
force in himself as divine monarch (as Alexander had been), 
Olympian Zeus manifest on earth in bodily form. Be did not 
leave his intention to surmise but remodeled his coinage 
accordingly and brought out two issues with the Olympian 
5. I Mace. 1:41,2. 










Zeus enthroned and holding Victory on his hand with the in-
scription BAE J" I£...n. ~ ANTI O)(OY ()EOZ-£7TlfAIVf)Y~ 
"2£ King Antiochus, God Manifest".8 The king definitely in 
the new series forsook the family. god,Apollo, for the Zeus 
of Alexander. 9 
a. Finance. The religious basis of the ruling force of 
the Seleucids led to the infamous policy of temple plunder 
which Antiochus, the Great inaugurated. The historic policy 
of the Seleucids had been one of religious toleration. 
Antiochus III himself had followed this course during the 
larger part of his reign as his early conduct toward the 
Jewish temple proves. IO Jason of Cyrene avers that "kings 
did honor to the place and glorified the temple with most 
noble gifts, so that even Seleucus, king of Asia from his 
own revenue provided all the expense of the sacrificial 
service_"ll 
The financial drain following the defeat at Magnesia 
necessitated an increase in revenue and the Seleucid rulers, 
reversing their former policy, turned to the wealthy temples 
for amelioration of their financial stringency. The first 
8. Edward T. Newell, Royal greek Portrait Coins (New 
York: Wayte Raymond, Inc., 1937), p. 58, Plate VI, 12,13,14. 
9. Loc. Cit. 
10. ~. Ant., 12:3:4-






instance of the use of this method was the pillage of the 
temple of Bel in Elam by Antiochus III in which expedition 
he lost his life. 12 Seleucus IV continued the policy in a 
safer manner. II Maccabees relates that Heliodorus, the 
minister of finance, visited Jerusalem, which was just another 
Temple state to him, and attempted to enter the Holy of Bolies 
and confiscate the Temple treasure. The author then says 
that the attempt was frustrated by angels who scourged the 
would be desecrator of the sanctuary and drove him away.13 
Heliodorus is without doubt the "exactor" mentioned in 
Daniel.14 Epiphanes brought pressure upon the Jews by 
investing an amenable high priest with authority at Jerusalem. 
Thus the money found its way into the royal treasury without 
violence. IS Tarn rejects the story that Epiphanes sought to 
sack the temple at Nanaia. 16 Rostovtzeff suggests that he 
probably did not need to but resorted to the same means that 
he had used so successfully at Jerusalem.17 The latter 
12. Strabo 14:1:18. 
13. II Macc. 3:1-40. Cf. Swain, pp. 76,7, thinks this 
miracle was to cover up intrigue between Beliodorus and the 
anti-he11entstic element of the kingdom. 
14. ~anie1 11:2Q. 
lS. II~. 4:39. 
16. ~actria, Appendix VII. 




opinion is supported by the statement of Jason of Cyrene that 
the priests at Nanaia brought the money out to Antiochus. 18 
These exactions were continued in Egypt where nHe had also 
sacridegiously despoiled most of the temples. n19 This policy 
was not a great success. The people never admitted the claim 
of the Seleucids to be vice-gerents of the gods on earth. 
The people met it with a fierce and fanatical resistance 
wherever it was projected. 
b. Colonization. The treaty of Apame& forbade the Syrians 
to recruit mercenaries from any country west of the Taurus. 
If Antiochus were to adhere to the terms of the treaty, the 
only possible way for the Seleucids to build up the Qreek 
element in their army was to plant Greek colonies in the 
realm and seek to curtail infanticide among the Greek 
citizens. The Seleudids were popular among the Greeks so 
the natural decision was to follow the policy begun by the 
founders of the dynasty, Seleucus and Antiochus. Many of 
the colonists were Greek20 but in the time of Epiphanes it 
is not to be assumed that all of the citizens of these col-
onies were Greek in race. By this time there was a large 
18. II Macc. 1:15. 
19. Polyb. 30:26:9. 
20. B. Niese, Geschichte der Griechischen gng Mak-




group of Hellenized barbarians who were anxious to take up 
Greek customs and Greek city life and thus receive the ad-
vantages thereby appertaining. The Seleucids placed these 
cities only where the king needed a strong garrison city in 
a threatened district. They were composed of strangers and 
for foreigners. "The interests of these strangers lay in 
maintaining the Seleucid power, to which they owed their 
21 privileges and their favoured position to their new country." 
Epiphanes' aim then was to 
••• knit together the various parts of his empire 
by extending and consolidating the net of urban 
communities which to some extent existed before 
Alexander and was further developed by him and his 
successors and by the early Seleucids. 
These urban centers were intended to be his points 
d'appui. In them the process of amalgamation--social 
and cultural--of the upper classes of the population 
was far advanced. The idea of Epiphanes was to reap 
the results of this natural process and to form out of 
the orientalized Greeks and the hellenized Orientals, 
mostly reSidents in the cities, one political and 
social group, closely knit together round a city life 
organized more or less on Greek models, and round a 
common Greco-Oriental religion in which the royal cult 
should play, an important part. With the help of 
this class Epiphanes hoped to solidify the old and 
new urban centres of his kingdom, to achieve a more 
reliable unity of his empire, and to secure success 
in his active foreign policy.22 
c. The -rro ~ ,>. The founding of Greek cities was done 
in one of two ways; either by planting a new ~DA/S with a 
21. W. M. Ramsay, The Cities of St. Paul (New York, 
C. Armstrong and Son, 1908)-; p. 157. -

















Greek constitution at some strategic point or by reorganiz-
ing and refounding some already existant town as a /loA I~ • 
The latter process was used in the refounding of Jerusalem 
and Babylon. The latter peculiarly kept its native name.23 
Tarn makes this peculiarity one of his proofs that Antiochus 
intended Babylon to be his new Capitol in a unified empire.~ 
There were a good many centers which could not claim the full 
I 
rank of the7r~Als but were military colonies. Much of the 
settlement of the Greeks was done indirectly by other cities. 
This is what enabled it to be done at all, for only 
the king could~found a "Trot! IS • •• even the foundation 
of a single rr"oA '5 meant for the king hard work. He 
had to find land for the city, build the wall, supply 
food, seed-corn, cattle and tools to give the people 
a start, remit taxation until the city had found its 
feet and decide personally innumerable housing, econ-
omic and social questions; give a constitution and 
get political life started; and settle the city law. 25 
The characteristics of a 716A 1S in the Seleucid empire 
differed from and are not to be confused with the classical 
Greek city states. They are difficult to ascertain but to 
the best of our knowledge they were the following: 
1. Autonomy within the limits of the suzerainty of the 
king, "Thus the constitution ••• was a compromise, a sort of 
23. Jos. Ant., 12:5. 
24. Bactria, pp. 187,8. 










limited monarchy where democratic freedom and autocratic 
rule tempered and restrained each other. 26 
2. A wall for protection. 
3. Greek political forms 1.~. A council, an Assembly, 
a division of the Greek population into tribes with conse-
quent rotation of prytanies, an elected magistrate and a 
gymnasium. 27 "In every Hellenic city the common religion 
of the Tribe was an extremely important element in the life 
and the thought and the patriotism of all citizens. 28 
4. Common religious worship. "The entire body of citi-
zens was knit together by their common religion." ••• The 
Jews were absolved from the ordinary laws and regulations of 
the city, if these conflicted with the Jewish religion:"29 
5. The gymnasium was not only the center of physical 
training but was the center of intellectual training for the 
common man as well. 30 It was the outstanding characteristic 
, 
of a ~OA,S. Indeed "the noblest feature of Greek city life 
was its zeal and provision for education. The minute care-
fulness with which those Asian-Greek cities legislated and 
provided for education. • .rouses the deepest admiration. 31 
26. W.M. Ramsay, ~ Letters ~ the Seven Churches 
(New York: A. C. Armstrong and Son, 1909), p. 131; w. S. 
Ferguson, Greek Imperialism (Boston: Boughton Mifflin Co., 
1913), p. 205. 
27. Bactria, p. 9. 
28. W.M. Ramsay, The Cities Q£ St. Paul, p. 176. 
29. W.M. Ramsay, The Letters 12 ~ §even Churches, 
p. 148; Cf. Jos. Ant., 12:3:2. 
30. tiactria, p. 18; W. S. Ferguson, ~. Cit. 











6. The king retained no interest in the land. 32 
7. The consent of the king was required for a town or a 
/" 33 
colony to become a -,,-o).!$ • It cost Menelaus 150 talents 
for Jerusalem. 34 to purchase the privilege 
8. The city controlled its own finances. In fact it 
was a partially self-governing state within a state. 35 
The Seleucids were always popular with the Greeks. 
Probably one reason for this is that they favored the Greeks 
and Greek cities greatly and the Greeks desired to retain 
their privileges. One result of this policy was they, the 
Seleucids, always kept the citadel of the cities in Greek 
hands. 36 The justification of this policy was demonstrated 
in the increase of the Phalanx of Epiphanes to 20,000 as 
compared with 16,000 in the army of Antiochus the Great. In 
the East however the Bactrian ~ only set Greek against 
Greek and so weakened the power of the Greek race as a whole 
that Greek hegemony was shattered by the Orientals and their 
36a Oriental culture, says Tarn. 
32. Bactria, p. 31; W. S. Ferguson, ~. Cit. 
33. ~., p. 9. 
34· il. l!l!££. 4: 9. 
35. Bel. Civ., p. 129; W. S. Ferguson, ~. Qit. 
36. Polyb. 5:48, 14; Bactria, pp. 22,26,32. 










2. Eastern Policy. As we have seen the natural expression 
of any ambitions Antiochus Epiphanes might have had for ex-
pansion was to find its maximum possibilities in the East. 
The work of realigning the eastern satrapies had not been 
completed by his father. Even on his famous "anabasis" for 
which he received such acclaim the "Great King" had not re-
conquered Bactria and for some reason had dropped his cam-
paign against Parthia and made a treaty of alliance with the 
king. 37 Be had nonetheless reestablished firmly the 
authority of the Selaucids in the East. Epiphanes now 
set out to continue the work of eastern aggrandizement. 
His first step was the refounding of Babylon as a ,,-6).u 
"with a theatre and at least one Gymnasium"38 As has been 
mentioned it is the only city so refounded that kept its 
Oriental name. The coins prove that Antiochus followed this 
course with a purpose, for they show the head of the king with 
the radiant crown of Helios and with the inscriptionBAr/lllY.L 
ANTIOXO Y 2f King Antiochus. On the reverse side, the 
Fortune of Babylon is enthroned like Zeus, holding victory 
37. N. C. Debouvois, A Political History of Parthia 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), P7 16,; 
Justin 41:5,7. 
38. Bactria, p. 192. 
55 
on her hand. 39 "No other city had ever been enthroned on 
any king1s coinage. n40 This all points to the intention 
upon Epiphanes l part to make Baby~on (the city which had 
been destined as Alexander's capitol), his own capitol city, 
retaining the name it had under "Alexander. 
II. THE EGYPTIAN WAR 
The Egyptian war was not a part of the plan and 
program of Antiochus Epiphanes. Be wisely determined to 
give Rome no reason for offense while he concentrated his 
efforts upon the reconquest and reorganization of the eastern 
part of his realm as his forefathers had know it in better 
days.41a The king of Syria had been planning an eastern cam-
paign when Egypt became a menace to him on the South. 
1. Causes. In the days of Seleucus IV Ptolemy V had enter-
tained hopes of vengeance against Syria. Bis father-in-law, 
Antiochus III, had seized Coele-Syria during Ptolemy's boy-
hood and when he grew to manhood he determined to exploit 
the disadvantage of the conquered Syrian kingdom to secure 
the return of this rich province to Egypt.4l The loss of 
39. ~ Sel. p. 36 nos. 23-30. Pl. XII 1-4. 
40. Bactrla, p. 188. 
41a. Supra p. 47. 








Coele-Syria was a great financial loss to Egypt and we notice 
an economic as well as political decline in the southern 
kingdom. 42 The untimely death of Ptolemy at the age of 
twenty-nine brought these ambitions to a halt. Cleopatra,' 
his wife, became the regent for her son Philometor and in her 
capable hands the kingdom was not plunged into war. 43 If it 
was true that she received half the revenue from the disputed 
border province as claimed, one can see why she was satisfied 
to maintain the status guo with Syria.44 The young queen-
regent too died suddenly and in her youth even as her husband 
had done before her leaving her young son in the hands of 
two notorious eunuchs as regents. 45 In order to inhibit the 
interference of Rome, they managed to have the official 
acclamaltion of the young Philometor a little over a year 
after his mother's death at the tender age of sixteen.46 The 
young king was under the complete control of the anti-
Syrian party in the persons of his two regents Eulaius and 
42. ~.!., p. 713. 
43. ~, ~. Qii. 
44. J. P. Mahaffy, ~ Em~ire 2! ~ Ptolemy's (London: 
1895), p. 331; l2!. !n1., 12:1 Off. 
45. w. Otto, ~. Cit., p. 1, a~akes l~l the year. 







Lenaius. Of them and their influence Otto says, 
Schuld hieran ist das neue, besonders unwUrdige 
Regiment, das jetzt anstatt der syrischen Konigs-
tochter Igypten geleitet hat; haben es doch Eulaies 
und Lenaios, die ja wohl beide Orientalen (s.S.2). 
und ehemalige Sklaven waren, gewagt, sich als Vormun-
der des unmundigen Konigs aufzuspielen und die 
Regierung zu usurpieren, wenn sie auch nicht wie 
Kleopatra offizielle Regentern geworden sind. Das 
Menschen, wie sie, die Herrschaft uber 19ypten 
erlangen und langere Zeit behaupten konnten, zeigt 
uns des sen Niedergang besonders eindringlich; es 
zeigt uns zugleich die'starke Degeneration des einst 
so stolzen makedonisch-griechischen Herrenelements, 
das sich unwurdigen Orientalen beugte, all das eigent-
lich nur verstandlich, wenn der ptolemaerhof damals 
schon sehr stark das Geprage eines orientalischen 
Hofes mit desen Haremswirtschaft und dauernden Haffin-
trigen getragen hat. Eulaios scheint von den beiden 
der FUhrende, Lenaios speziell derjenige gewesen zu 
sein, welcher die Verwaltung der Finanzen an sich 
gerissen hatte.47 
The regents determined to precipitate a war with Syria and 
win back Phoenicia and Palestine. Antiochus while planning 
an expedition to the east heard of their plans for war from 
Appolonius whom he had sent as his representative to the 
coronation of Philometor.48 
Antiochus made a trip of inspection to the border provinces 
49 
and regarrisoned them with new troops, sending Meleager at 
the same time as his envoy to Rome with orders to inform the 
Senate and protest that Ptolemy was entirely unjust in 
47. ~., p. 24. 
48. II ~. 4:21. 






attacking him. 50 
2. First Egyptian Campaign. Antiochus Epiphanes met the 
attack of the Egyptians and was commended for his energetic 
daring which Polybius~ who was pro-Egypt,51 termed worthy of 
the royal dignity.52 The Egyptian offensive was crushed 
above Pelusium and Antiochus at the same time won a naval 
victory of Pelusium. 53 In the eyes of Polybius, Antiochus 
acted discreditably at.Pelusium either by some ruse in the 
battle or by his capture of the young Phi1ometor, whom 
Eulaius had advised to flee with his treasure. 54 Bevan holds 
that in some manner Antiochus induced the garrison at Pelus-
ium to revolt. 55 Alexandria was terrified and certain that 
Egypt would fall to Antiochus, says Livy in his highly inaccu-
50. Polyb. 37:19. 
51. Ibid., 29:23. 
51a.W.W. Tarn, review of W. Otto, QQ. Cit. l.ft.§. LV 
(1935) p. 98~ says that Otto demolishes any claim of the four 
campaigmand definitely proves that there were only two campaigns 
in Egypt. Every later writer accepts this view. B. Niese, QR. Cit. Vol. III, p. 170, N: 2 mentions a three and a four 
campaign theory of the Egypt1an war based on a harmonizing 
of I & ll~. and Li1l:', 42:29;5--both of which he disallows •. 
,IRe puts two Egyptian campaigns in 170-169. 
52. Ibid., 28:18. 
53. ~ 44:19. 
54. Polyb. 28:18,21; Diod. Sic., 30:17; Jos. Ant., 12:5:2; 
Swain, says, "(they) saw that flight would discredit the king 
and thus make them the more indispensible." pp. 80,1. 
55. House §!l., pp. 137-9; Diod. Sic. 30:14,18; Daniel 






rate account of this struggle. 56 Otto believes that the 
citizens of Alexandria were called to arms in their defence. 57 
There was a revolution in the Capitol. 58 Tne citizens re-
fused to bow to Antiochus and set up the younger brother of 
Philometor as King Euergetes ·11, a title taken from a former 
Ptolemy who had been victorious over Syria. 
Rome was embroiled in her war with Macedonia which did 
not go so well for her in its first stages and the impulsive 
Antiochus was encouraged to take advantage of his successful 
defense of the border and invade Egypt. Be made his way from 
Pelusium across the Delta to Memphis. 
The statement of Jerome that Antiochus was crowned king of 
Egypt is borne out by coins found with the effigy of Antiochus 
as king of Egypt. We now have found a papyrus (Tebt. 111,1), 
in the ordinary form of the kings of Egypt, issuing a decree 
to the cleruchs in the Crocodilopolite nome. Otto contends 
that Antiochus was merelY9acting as regent for his nephew 
as he had done in Syria.' 
In the enthusiasm of the moment the impulsive king of Syria 
forgot about Rome and his determination to 'avoid trouble with 
56. Livy, Loc. Cit. 
57. Otto, ~. Cit., pp. 42,3, N. 1. 
~ 58. A. Bouche Leclercq, Bistoire des peleucides 
(Paris: 1913), pp. 255,6. 
59. Cf. Otto, QE. Cit., p. 55; Swain, p. 83; Bevan, 





her on any account. If he was crowned, he quickly moved to 
obviate any difficulties thereby involved by oPPosing the new 
Ptolemy at Alexandria not in his own name as conqueror of 
Egypt but in the name of his other nephew Philometor who was 
in the camp of Antiochus. This he thought would win the 
Alexandrines over to his side and likewise placate the Greek 
world for already emissaries were arriving at Memphis to 
blame the war on Eulaius and. plead for mercy for Egypt. To 
this Antiochus replied that he and his nephew were allies. 
Be denied being at war with Egypt. 60 He sought the favor of 
the Greek element of the Egyptian population by such expedients 
as presenting each of the Greek residents of Naucratis with a 
gold stater. 6l Otto contends that Antiochus sought to win 
over the Egyptian native element to himself. 62 The natives of 
Egypt had been extremely restive ever since they had fought 
side by side with Greeks at Raphia. They had made trouble 
for Ptolemy V continuously and their revolt may have been the 
reason that Ptolemy V did not prosecute his projected invasion 
of Coele-syria before he died. 63 Our sources all corroborate 
60. Polyb. 28:20,23. 
61. IbiS· 
62. otto, QQ. Cit., p. 55. 
63. Bevan, Eg~Rt, pp. 273ff. 
/, 1 
the statement of Daniel that Antiochus Epiphanes was a 
master of intrigue. 64 
61 
In any event Antiochus continued his march on 
Alexandria and besieged the city. The Alexandrines under 
Euergetes II made a stout resistance. A sudden report that 
Jerusalem had risen in his rear caused Antiochus to raise 
the Siege and hasten off to quell the new disturbance which 
menaced his supply lines. Be left Philometer in Memphis and 
also left a large garrison at Pelusium thus holding the key 
in Egypt in order to invade it when he chose leaving the two 
brothers to fight it out for Egypt and then purposing to 
destroy whichever of them was the victor. 65 
3. Revolt in Antioch (Jerusalem). II Maccabees explains 
that the reason for the revolt at Jerusalem was that Jason, 
whom Antiochus had replaced as high priest, while liYling as 
an exile had heard that Antiochus had died. He thus struck 
suddenly at Jerusalem seeking to dislodge his brother who 
had succeeded him and thus present the successor to Antiochus 
with a fait accompli and perhaps be retained in the high 
priesthood by the new Seleucid ruler. Jason stormed Jerusa-
lem. The Jewish masses were on his side. 66 ~ben he failed 
64. Daniel 11:20. 
65. Livy 45:11. 
66. CAB VIII, 505. 
I . 
62 
to take the citadel where Menelaus had taken refuge, his 
troops looted the city.67 Antiochus, thinking that Judea was 
in revolt "set out from Egypt like a wild beast and took the 
city by storm. "68 Jason of Cyrene tells in ex~erated lang-
uage of the brutality of the Syrian soldiers as they too 
were loosed upon the city.69 Of course the loyal hellenists 
as citizens of the 1TO~/S would be spared. They were the loyal ! 1 • 
neucleus of the city who had held the citadel for the king. 
Both First and Second Maccabees state that at this 
time Antiochus Epiphanes despoiled the Temple. 70 .Be is said 
to have taken away 1800 talents from the temple and in the 
language of an enemy, "hurried off to Antioch, thinking in 
his arrogance that he would make the land navigable and the 
67. There were two parties at least in Jerusalem. The 
citizens of Antioch, the Greek city and their hellenized 
sympathizers formed one party. The strict Jews and anti-
hellenistic people would naturally form another party which 
was probably pro-Egyptian. Jason was a hellenist. .Be had 
been the leader of the hellenizing movement in Judea. His 
act was not pro-Egyptian nor anti-Syrian so much as it was 
Anti-Menelaus. Jason hoped to replace Menelaus under the 
Seleucid rule now that Antiochus was dead (as he thought). 
68. II~. 5:5-14. Swain, p. 84., places this episode 
at the close of the Second campaign-against most authorities • 
.Be refuses to accept this as the cause behind Antiochus' 
departure from Egypt, Swain thinks Antiochus left Egypt to 
prosecute his Eastern Campaign giving his alliance with 
Philometer as his excuse (Cf. Polyb. 28:23:4f). W. Kolbe, 
Qy. Cit., p. 152; Otto QQ. Q!1., pp. 66ff. 
69. Ibid. 





sea traversable on foot, he was so intoxicated in his mind."71 
4. Period between Campaigns. With Egypt in a turmoil, Judea 
pacified, his treasury replenished from the loot of Egypt and 
Jerusalem and his army victorious, Antiochus was in an excel-
lent position. Be could settle down in his capitol and there 
keep in touch with the result of the Third Macedonian War and 
then take suitable steps as. the opportunity afforded itself. 
The first siege of Alexandria spread dismay in the 
economic and commercial world. 72 Egypt had been a strong 
sea power in the Aegean and her trade was especially impor-
tant to Rhodes. They at the suggestion of Rome sent an 
embassy to Antiochus urging peace. 73 After the siege Antiocmus 
sought the good wishes of the Greeks and the Romans by sending 
an embassy to Rome with 150 talants, 50 for the Romans and 100 
to be distributed among the Greek cities on the way.74 These 
presents served to soften the refusal of Antiochus to cease 
hostilities, for even Rome had sent envoys headed by Titus 
Numisius to try to make peace; but they had "returned to Rome 
without achieving anything at all."75 Perseus was still in 
71. II Me££. 5:21. 
72. Hous~ Sel., p. 140. 
73. Polyb. 28:23. 28 :17.:4; 28:23. 
74. Ibid. , 28:22. 




the field so Antiochus was in a position to be adamant. 
The Achaeans were about to send aid to Egypt during 
the winter but petty Roman jealousies interfered and Egypt 
was left to her own devices. 76 In this state the brothers 
P.tolemy recognized the wisdom of working together. "Autio-
chos st{tait tromp' une foi de plus, et toujours parce qutil 
s'exageiait l'incapacite' des ses adversalres. t,77 Cleopatra II, 
their Sister, seemed to have been the moving genius behind 
the rapprochement. The Alexandrines opened their gates to 
Philometor and thus obviated any difficulty in the way of 
recognition by Antiochus Epiphanes. Both of the brothers 
~ ,.-
now wore the crown and exercised the royal e ~ 0 uo-tc:r, author-
ity.78 Antiochus struck as soon as the news arrived that the 
brothers were united. Polybius said that Antiochus forgot 
all that he wrote and spoke about merely desiring to put the 
rightful king on the Egyptian throne. "XtA-~E-7rOv.1~ (TBA fJ V 
l.p fA- E. \/ 1ft l ," moralized Polybius, II is hard 12. ~ ~. 79 
5. ~cond EgYptian Campaign. The Syrian fleet took Cyprus 
as soon as the army had begun its march south. From Pelusium 
the Syrian soon overran all of Egypt but Alexandria for the 
second time. At Rhinocolura envoys arrived from Philometor 
76. l.bid,., 29: 23 • 
77. ./ Bouche-Leclercq , Qll. Ci~., p. 258. 
78. lPj.d. 29:23:5; il!l 45:11. 
79. Polyb. 29:26. 
(-
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offering thanks to his unc~e and stating that all was well 
and the throne had been regained to his satisfaction. Anti-
ochus' rep~y was an u~timatum demanding Cyprus and Pelusium 
with its surrounding country. A time limit was attached to 
the demand. 80 Time was precious for the decision ei~her 
had been already made or soon would be in Macedonia. If Rome 
should win, Antiochus only hope was to present Rome with a 
fait ~mRli. There was no hope save in Rome for EgYpt. 
6. Eleusis and aft~. June 22, 168, saw the doom of Perseus 
at Pydna. Victorious Rome could now settle accounts with 
the Easterner. At Eleusis about four miles from Alexandria 
a Roman embassy ~ed by C. Popilius Laenas met Antiochus. 
The king recognized the Romans from his long stay in the 
Roman capitol. He knew the Roman mind and doubtless guessed 
their mission. The churlish Roman acted in a most offensive 
and exceeding~y arrogant manner. He refused to greet the 
king until he had delivered his ultimatum that the Syrian 
withdraw from Egypt and Cyprus at once. When Antiochus asked 
for time to consider the matter, the Roman drew a circle 
around the king, with his wal~1ng stick, and forbad him to 
leave the circle until he had a reply for Rome. Antiochus 
Epippanes was not ready to try conclusions with Rome just 
------





yet and there was but one possible reply, acquiescense to 
all that Rome demanded. 81 
Polybius said that Rome could act in Egypt because 
Perseus'fate had been decided. Bad Antiochus not been certain 
of this "'he would never,' I think, 'have obeyed the Roman 
behests.,,,82 After the fixed number of days Antiochus and his 
whole army left Egypt "deeply hurt and complaining indeed." 
Popilius then hurried up to Cyprus to see that the Syrian 
troops were evacuated. 83 Otto looked upon Eleusis as the 
end of all Antiochus 1 hopes. Be says: 
Der Tag von Eleusis, der den Konig so Plotzlich um 
all seine Hoffnungen gebracht hatte, das Ungluck, das 
ihm zugestoszen war, bat ihn nicht gefestigt, sondern 
hat ihn zerschlagen. Das zwiespaltige Bild, das, an-
scbeinend unau~geblicben, in der antiken Uberlieferung 
uns entgegentritt, beruht docb wohl darauf, dasz der 
in seinem -Innersten getroffene Mann sich damals stark 
gewandelt hat. Der bizarre, ja etwas leichtfertige 
Zug, der diesem von Haus ausbegabten, von sich selbst 
uberzeugten Menschen zu eiger gewesen sein musz, ist 
unter dem unerwarteten Schicksalsschlage, der ihn 
betroffen hat, zum bestimmenden Zuge seines Wesens 
geeworden; der Konig wurde ein innerlich zerrissener, 
nervoser Mansch. Er hat sicb durch tolle Streiche, 
durch verschwenderishe Hanlungen, die ihm seine 
unbeschrankte Konigliche Macht zu zeigen schienen, zu 
betauben versucht, hat sich eben immer wieder, um das 
auf ibm lastende Minderwertigkeitsgefuhl zu uberwinden, 
vorzuspiegelnversucht, dasz or, der Groszkonig ASiens, 
noch etwas vermocbte, und bat dementsprechend gehandelf, 
sich weiter grosze Ziele gesteckt. 84 
81. Polyb. 29:27; Livy 45:12; Diod. Sic. 31:2; App. 
Syr. 66; Justin 34:3:1f. 
82. Polyb. 29:27:12,13. 
83. Ibid. 29:27. 
84. W. Otto. QR. Cit., p. 84. 
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In contrast to this gloomy picture Bevan says that Antiochus 
had turned from bankrupcy to riches and had changed the 
balance of power in the East against the Romans' will. 85 
Tarn takes up the cudgels with Otto, contending that Antiochus 
expected to be turned out of Egypt and did not mind failure 
in this adventure, for it was not a real objective with him 
but only a rash hope. 86 All must agree with Tarn that the 
day at Eleusis demonstrated great self-control on the part 
of a fiery character such as Antiochus Epiphanes, who 
swallowed the insult, with a victorious army at his back, 
and an insulting boor before him. 87 
Soon thereafter Antiochus sent envoys to Rome to con-
gratulate them upon their victory over Perseus. They 
"assured the Senate that their king regarded the peace which 
the Senate had imposed as preferable to any victory". and 
that commands of the gods would not have been more dutifully 
obeyed. 88 
IV. THE EAST 
1 .• Firs~ East~ Q.amI!~:!:.in. Soon after the Egyptian struggle 
Antiochus Epiphanes came to agreement with Eucratides. He 
85. House Sel., p. 140. 
86. Bactria, p. 192; Swain, p. 87, considers Torri's 
argument here to be conclusive. 
87. Ibid.. 
88. Livy 45:13. 
1 \, 
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recognized him as king and sponsored his campaign to win 
Bactria. Rostovtzeff insisys that Eucratides was an inde-
pendent king. 89 Tarn contends that they had divided the 
potential Seleucid realm into two parts with Antiochus as 
ruler of the West and Eucratides as sub-king in the East 
after they had conquered it. 90 It does not seem unreason-
able to presume that the two men were in some sort of agree-
ment under which Eucratides went east in the name of tbe 
Seleucid king to wrest tbe Satrapy of Bactria from tbe 
Euthydymids who had asserted their independence of their 
Seleucid masters. Antiocbus for his part was to settle 
affairs in the west and then the two armies were to attad: 
the rebels in Parthia from the east and the west in a concepted 
89. R.!., p. 1493, n. 125. 
90. Bactria, p. 203. Tarn worked out this hypothesis 
in an effort to discover a sufficient justification for the 
JrD~~~at Daphne (which was a Greek form of Triumph). He 
could not follow otto and the older historians in accepting 
the Egyptian War as such a justification. In casting about 
for a solution to this problem Tarn discovered that the chron-
ology generally accepted for Eucratides and the EuthydMmids 
was by no means definite. He then was the first to study the 
whole problem intenSively. His investigation led him to make 
Eucratides contemporary with Antiochus Epiphanes (in fact he 
claims they were second cousins). With Eucratides as a sub-
king, Antiochus could then claim his victories as Antiochus t 
own and thus celebrate a triumph at Daphne which would match 
that of Aemilius Paullus and at· the same time demonstrate\..'· 
that his ambitions were centered in the East, (Cf. Below 
p. 71). This view is now accepted in its essentials (Cf. n. 




\ I . 
drive. If this hypothesis is correct (and it seems quite 
plausible), Eucratides called upon the loyalty of the Greek 
cities of Bactria, raised the standard of revolt against the 
usurpers and in a brief period of time with a small force 
became in the name of Antiochus the "Savior" of Bactria • 
........ This title crw T I'( f' had the special significance of an 
individual rescuing a territory from an opponent--in this 
case rescuing the Seleucid cities of Bactria from the rebel 
Euthydymid, Demetrius. 91 
The ease of the victory in Bact~ia can be explained 
according to Tarn92 by two closely connected facts which 
seemed to be well known to both Eucratides and Antiochus. 
The Euthydymids in their bid for power had definitely gone 
counter to the policy of the Seleucids which favored the 
Greeks over the Iranians. Naturally the Greek citizens would 
resent the loss of their special favors and would look to any 
general for help who would be disposed to restore them to 
their favored position. Again because of the special favor 
of the Seleucids, the Greek-Macedonian settlers of the Seleucid 
kingdom were always loyal to the person of the reigning 
Seleucid when it was possible. So it was the most natural 
91. Ibid., pp. 175, 204. 





thing in the world for the Greeks in Bactria to look upon 
Antiochus as their "Savior" and as they were the military 
back-bone of the country their assistance to Eucratides 
would be decisive. 
This victory on the part of Antiochus Epiphanes t ally 
enabled Antiochus to flaunt his triumph at Daphne in the 
face of the Rome which had so degraded him at Eleusis. 
,-
2. The -rtojJ- 7r'l at Daphne. The festival at Daphne was a 
direct answer to the "games celebrated in Macedonia by Aemil-
ius Paullus. !!w93 'rha tit was primarily a military triumph 
on the Greek style is indicated by the fact that the first 
section of the procession was the review of Antiochus t strong 
army--stronger than that of his father at Magnesia. 94 
Polybius t vivid description of Antiochus army is classic. 
It was headed by five thousand men in the prime of 
life armed after the Roman fashion and wearing 
breastplates of chain armor. Next came 5000 Mysians, 
and immediately behind them 3000 Cilicians, armed in 
the manner of light in£antry, wearing gold crowns, 
Next came .3000 Thracians and 5000 Gauls. They were 
followed by 20,000 Macedonians of whome 10,000 bore 
golden shields, 5000 brazen shields and the rest 
silver shields. Next marched 250 pairs of gladiators, 
and behind them 1000 horsemen: from Nisa and .3000 
from Antioch itself; most of them had crown and 
trappings of gold and the rest trappings of silver. 
Next to these came the so-called "companion cavalry," 
numbering about 1000, all with gold trappings, and 
next the regiment of "royal friends" of equal number 
and similarly accoutred; next 1000 picked horse 
9.3. Athen. 5:194, 10:139=Polyb. 30:25:1 





followed by the so-called "agema" supposed to be the 
crack cavalry corps, numbering about 1000. Last of 
all marched the ftcataphract" or mailed horse, the 
horses and men being armed in complete mail as the 
name indicated. Of these too there were about 1500. 
All the above wore purple surcoats in many cases em-
broidered with gold and heraldic designs. Next came 
100 chariots drawn by six horses and 40 drawn by four 
horses, and then a chariot drawn by four elephants 
and another drawn by a pair, and f~allY 36 elephants 
in single file with their housings. , 
One notices immediately that the elephants were in 
the second most important section of the parade--the final 
section. This direct breach of the treaty of Apamea which 
forbade ~ keeping ~ elephants !1 all ~ another brazen 
warning to Rome ~ Antiochus ~ ~ to ~ trifled with. 
Only if Antiochus had been victorious elsewhere than in 
Egypt would be have been in a position to flaunt this breach 
of the treaty so deliberately. 
The predilection of the ancient writers to ignore 
anything but western history has deprived us of information 
and likewise imposed upon our evaluations in this period of 
history a distinct western bias. A dated inscription affords 
the information that Antiochus went to Babylon during the 
summer following the Spring Festival at Daphne, and there 
celebrated in August-September 166 )(O(l'tr;~p (~. The 
inscription records a gift made to Epiphanes by Philippus, 







minister for affairs. The inscription refers to Antiochus 
as "Savior of ASia. n97 
,-
The term X~f'~"'£f c~ signifies a sacrifice of thanks-
giving for something which the celebrant considered 
a deliverance. • .he (AntiochuS) must have attached 
great importance to holding them at his destined 
capitol, or he would never have gone to Babylon in 
the hot weather; they wer~ obviously a thanksgiving 
for the "saving of Asian98 
during the first Eastern campaign with the assistance of 
Eucartides either as ally or sub-king. 99 
Antiochus now brought out a new series of coins upon 
which Zeus has the features of Antiochus and he now takes 
the full title BAr/AEY£ ANTIO){OY' BEOr E7TI;ANHE. 
HIK.H +OP II , of King Antiochus, god manifest, victorious. IOO 
Eucratides made a campaign into India but failed to 
accompliSh his mission there and in 159 was slain in battle 
by the parthians.10l 
3. Second Eastern Campaign. Antiochus to the best of his 
knowledge in 165 had settled things in Jud.a and set out 
for the East. He reduced Armenia and forced the king to 
acknowledge his supremacy.102 Next he went to Elymals. 
96. II. ~. 13:23. 
97. OGIS, 253. 
98. Bactria, p. 195. 
99. H.!., pp. 1493. 
100. BMC, Sel., p. 61, No. 27; Newell, QQ. Cit. p. 58 
Plate VI, No. 14. 
101. Bactria, p. 212. 









Tarn insists that this was a peaceful visit to Susa and con-
nects it with his marriage to the goddess Atargatis. l03 He 
then went to Gabae on the road to Ecbatana.104 The king was 
Showing his might to his vassals on his way eastward to 
attack Hekatompylos, the capitol of Parthia. Tarrt0~ays that 
Eucratides was in India at the time and could not join him 
in the campaign, but Antiochus had the main army with him and 
would have been fully able to cope with the Parthia of his 
day just as his father would have been in his had not death 
taken them both so suddenly, for Epiphanes died at Gabae106 
of ~8'4r'5 consumption, the disease which had cut down so 
many of the Macedonian kings. l07 
Thus he died in his youth and the kingdom was left to 
~he mercy of the dynastic struggles of the family and the 
watchful hindrance of the Romans. Otto gives us a gloomy 
summary which seems distorted. 
Als Epiphanes im Fruhjahr 163 v. Chr. Vorzeitig, 
wohl and der Schwindsucht, fern 1m osten in der 
Landschaft PerSis starb, da war das Seleukidenreich, 
das er zu einer wirklichen Groszmacht wieder zu 
erheben gehofst hatte, bereits ein endgultig ge-
10.3. Bactria, p. 193; App. Syr., 46. 
104. II Macc. 
--
9:1. 
105. Bactria, pp. 214,5. 
106. Polyb. 31:9. 






brochener Statt, vollig hilflos gebenuber dem ruck-
sichtslosen Streben Roms nach Sicherheit und Baherr-
schung des Ostens. Und so is ein Mann wie Antiochus 
trotz seines groszen Strebens, durch das er aber mit 
Rom in Gegensatz kommen muszte, sum Totengraber 
swines Sta~tes geworden; 108 
While Antiochus lived Rome regretted not enforcing the dis-
armament clauses of the treaty of Apamea. This is proved by 
the fact that they saw to it that the Syrian army was wreck-
ed immediately after he had died.109 But Antiochus' army 
was stronger than that of his father, AntiochusIII, and many 
Romans knew that had there been competent generalship at 
Magnesia the outcome might well have been a different story 
altogether. 
The reputation of Antiochus Epiphanes in the world 
was great. Polybius said that his "power was irresistible.,,110 
Jason of Cyrene says that he was nstronger than any other 
king. nlll Had he lived but two more years Tarn assures us 
that he would have finished the conquest of Parthia and 
then would have been able to join Eucratides in Bactria and 
they together· might have been able to reestablish the kingdom 
of Alexander in the East. As it was he failed because he 
died. 
108. W. Otto, Q£. Cit., p. 88. 
109. App. Syr., 46; Zonaris 9:25=Dio. 20:69. 
110. Diod. Sic. 31:17a=Polyb. 




The Seleucid empire was never the same again. The 
Jews were able to free themselves from the declining power 
of the succeeding Seleucids whose internecine strife for the 
benefits of the declining kingdom finally destroyed it. 
Antiochus had greatly weakened the power of the Greeks in the 
Farther East and caused the failure of the 'promising experiment 
of the Euthydymids in India. 
CHAPTER V 






ANTIOCBUS AND THE JEWS 
Once the fact is established that Antiochus was primarily 
interested in the East and there based his ambitions for the 
renascence of the Seleucid Empire, the other events in his 
reign fall naturally into their proper p~rspective. The 
Egyptian War, known as the Sixth Syrian War, becomes a side 
issue. In preparation for the Eastern Campaign Antiochus 
needed a· settled border in his rear. His early successes by 
their magnitude and ease prompted him to overreach himself 
temporarily and seize for himself the diadem of Egypt. This 
foolhardy step was quickly repented of and the crown 
relinquished in favor of his young nephew Philometor. By the 
same token the Maccabean struggle with the Seleucids is dimmed 
to its proper magnitude. Antiochus did not consider the 
problem worthy of his personal attentio~neither did he 
allow it to deter his projected campaign in the Be.·st. The 
king cannot completely shake off the onus of his persecution 
but the barbaric savagery of the execution of the king's 
commands should probably be attributed to the underlings who 
in their hatred of the Jews gave free reign to their sadistic 
natures. l 




I. JEWISH POST·&XILIC PERIOD 
1. Oriental Phase. The captivity in Babylon destroyed the 
historic Jewish kingdom. After a period of about seventy 
years small groups of pious Jews were allowed to make their 
way back to their homeland. There they rebuilt their ancient 
shrine and often found the Satraps easy masters. 2 This was 
made possible by the liberal policy of the Persians. Under 
Cyrus, the Persians, who had surplanted the Babylonian rulers, 
sought the good will of subject peoples by allowing them 
some privileges. Under the Persian rule ~his small band of 
religious devotees lived quietly in~ir holy city. The 
virtual autonomy of the Persian period allowed the develop-
ment of a well-organized ruling caste of priests. 3 
2. ~reek phase. Suddenly into the comparative quiet of 
the Persian empire plunged Alexander. The power of Persia 
toppled. The world wondered at the ease with which the 
empire was overcome. Daniel pontrays Persia as a two-horned 
ram attacked by a he-goat (the symbol of Alexander). He says, 
"the ram had no power to stand before him, he cast him to the 
ground, and trampled upon him, there being none to rescue the 
2. Max Radin, In! l~ ~mong the Greeks and ~ Bomans (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 
1915), p. 57. 
3. Ibid., p. 61. 
ram from his power. n4 Thus it seemed to the innocent 
bystander in Judea. 
78 
a. Alexander. Alexander was not, however, just another 
military conqueror. His conquest was as much a conquest in 
the realm of culture as it was in the realm of military.5 
He openly sought to carry the civilization of Hellas to the 
barbarians. His policy of Hellenization was later modified 
and recognition was given to the distinct advantages dis-
covered among the Persians. nThe union of oriental and occi-
dental was attempted in every city of western ASia. n6 His 
early death opened the way for a continuous series of wars 
of succession on the part of his generals and their descen-
dants. 
b. The Ptolem~s. A few short years after Alexander's 
death, Ptolemy I had secured his grip upon Coele-Syria and 
Palestine remained a part of the EgYptian empire for 122 
years. 7 "The successors to Alexander retained his strong 
Hellenistic bent, and Palestine. • .in a special sense, 
might be regarded as having borne ~ brunt of ~ Hellen-
8 1stic attack." Ramsay says that the Hellenizing policy of 
4. Daniel 8:7f. 
5. J. McKee Adams, "The Struggle Q£ the Jews with 
Hel enism" (A TheSiS, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary 
1927 , p. 237. 
6. W.M. Ramsay, The Cities of St. Paul (New York: C. 
Armstrong and Son, 1908), p. 88. 
7. Supra, p. 18. 








the Macedonian rulers was a noble and generous one expecially 
in the realm of education and produced excellent results in 
9 Western Asia generally. 
The most efficient methods that the Greeks used in 
their attempts to hellenize the Jews were permeating and 
fusive. They did not use force until Epiphanes' reign. Under 
Philadelphus an intricate system of sugliemental commercial 
routes was opened up which made communication through 
Palestine easier and thus brought the forces of Hellenism 
into readier contact with the Jews. lO The extension of 
religious favors to the Jews nopened the hearts of the Jewish 
leaders at Jerusalem. nll The intermingling of peoples in the 
empire naturally aided in establishing the dominant culture 
throughout the realm. 
In order to develop the economic life of Egypt and thus 
facilitate the collection of large sums of money as taxes, 
the Ptolemies introduced the Greek business man who demanded 
pOSition and privilege. Other Hellenized peoples were 
distributed through the empire and the Jews themselves went 
out from their native land and in dwelling among other 
9. W. M. Ramsay, QQ. £!1., p. 182. 
10. Ibid., pp. 223-5. 
11. Ibid; Jos. !g1. (12:2:5-10), mentions munificent gifts 
by the Ptolem~es to the Temple at Jerusalem. There is no 
mention of any interruption of the Temple worship save in III 
Maccabees which is worthless historically. The need for a 
translation of the Jewish Law (known as the Septuagint), 





peoples subjected themselves to the forces of the foreign or 
1-gentile culture. 2 
The Greek cities founded in the land were centers of 
Greek culture. 
L'esprit tolerant et sceptique de l'hellenisme se 
propageait dans les regions d'alentour, a mesure que 
les colonies greco-macedoniennes s'implantaitent 
,.,-
soutour du lac de Genezareth et dans l~vallee du 
Jourdain. La race Juive, deja dispersee dans la 
vaste triangel compris entre Babylone, Ephese et 
Alexandrie, et merne plus loin en Cyrenaique, paraiss-
ait ne plus offrir dans sa patrie un groupe assez 
compact pour resister longtemps ~ la civilization 
hellenique qui commencait a la cerner de toutes 
parts. Les colonies grecques formaient autour de la 
Palestine comme un cercle qui allait se resserrant 
de plus en plus.13 
The Ptolemies were builders of cities in Palestine for the 
country was in a recalcitrant mood. Each city was built with 
purely military and political objects in ~w. There was a 
line of coastal cities from Gaza to Phoenicia, another east 
of the Jordan and a line to the South of Idumaea. 14 There 
were numbers of Greek and Macedonian settlers as well as 
Hellenized orientals in these cities. Ramsay says, 
There is rarely a case in which the Greeks formed the 
sole population of a city which they founded in a 
12. QAtl VII, 111,2. 
13. Bouche-Leclercq, Histoire ~ Seleucids (Paris: 
1913,4), pp. 236,7. Adams, (QQ.Cit., p. 237), says that 
there are more ruins of Greek walled cities in Palestine than 
in any other similar area in all the world. "In this circle 
of Greek towns Judea was undoubtedly a survival of the past," (CAB VII, 192). . 





foreign land. The strength and permanence of the 
Greek colonies was due to their power of assimilating 
the native population and imparting to it something of 
their own genius and aspirations.15 
Another element contributing to the hellenizing process 
among the Jews was the so-called dispersion. 16 From personal 
choice and by royal policy the dispersion of the Jews was 
extended throughout the Ptolemaic and Selucid realms. This 
situation continued until there were, in the day when Judea 
gained her independence, as many Jews outside Judea as were 
in it.17 These scattered Jews remained, to a certain extent, 
faithful to their religious shrine. This fidelity maintained 
their contact with the homeland. They were however at the 
very least mildly hellenized and thus brought to their own 
people some of the results of their contact with the 
Hellenistic world. Jouguet says, ftAlexandrian Jewry was so 
hellenized that it could hardly speak anything but Greek. n18 
15. W. M. Ramsay, Q£. Cit., p. 121. 
16. Bevan, (House Sel., pp. 165,6), mentions five lines 
of admitted evidence on the Diaspora or Dispersion of the 
Jews. 1. There were other orientals in the Greek world in 
the fourth century. 2. A hellenized Jew visited Aristotle 
(Jos. Contra Apion I, 176). J. Large numbers of Jews never 
returned from the Exile in Babylon. 4. In Judas Maccabeas l 
day Jews lived in Galilee and the Transjordan region. 5. The 
papyri tell of the Jews in Egypt and their strong influence. 
17. Max Radin, QR. Cit., p. 63. 
18. Pierre Jouguet, Macedonian Imperialism and ~he 
Hellenization of the ~ (New York: Knopf, 1932;;-p. 377. 
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It is significant that tradition states that the Jewish 
Scriptures were translated into the Greek during the reign 
of Ptolemy 11.19 
Of course it is to be expected that the Jew was not the 
only one affected by a mingling of peoples of differing 
cultures and religions. The Jew was a force in the religious 
world of his day.20 He had a marked influence upon Gentile 
thinkers. 
The Jewish insistence upon one supreme God, completely 
other than man, worshipped without images, in a temple 
where His presence was symbolized by darkness and 
silence, appealed to the best thought 0flthe time 
which was moving ••• toward monotheism. 
c. The ,§eleucids. The Jews were not adverse to Syrian 
Rule. Josephus says that they welcomed Antiochus III as a 
deliverer and assisted him in holding the country against 
the Egyptian general, Scopas. 22 There was however no change 
in the policy of Hellenism within Judea when the Seleucids 
gained control of Palestine. "While those rulers ~Seleucids 
and Ptolemies), were engaged in an incessant struggle among 
themselves, thel ~ never s1 variance QU ~he issue of 
19. Jos Ant., 12:2. 
20. Hguse Sel., p. 164. 
21. Dodd, The.Bible and the Greeks, p. 243, quoted in 
W.O.E. Oesterly, The~ ~ Judaism during the Greek Period 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941), p. 21. 
22. Jos. Ant., 12:3:3. 
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Hellenization_ n23 Ferguson says, nThe most striking fea-
ture in the internal policy of the Seleucids is the attempted 
transfer! into Asia of .the urban form of life theretofore 
characteristic of Hellas. n24 The Jews were especially popu-
lar as colonists with the Seleucids. 25 The religious privileges 
granted them kept their loyalty to the Seleucids steadfast. 
Their religious peculiarities marked them off from other men 
and kept them from uniting with other races against the king. 
The only breach in relations between the Jews and Antiochus 
the Great or Seleucus IV was during the attempted raid upon 
the treasury of the Jewish temple by Heliodorus, the minister 
of finance forSeleucus IV. 26 There was no change in policy 
caused by the change of the Jews from Egyptian to Syrian rule. 
II. ANTIOCHUS' POLICY OF HELLENIZATION 
1. General folicy. The general policy of Antiochus Epiphanes 
23. Adams, Q2. Cit. p. 238. 
24- w. S. Ferguson, Greek Imperialism (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1913), p. 196. 
25. E. R. Bevan, The Legacl of ~srael (Oxford: 1928), 
p. 36. Here Bevan states that Antiochus III sent 2QQG Jews 
into Lydia and Phrygia as military colonists and used them as 
a counterweight against the Greeks and the natives; Cf. Jos. 
Ant., 12:3:1; Ramsay, Q2. Cit. p. 174ff. 
26. Supra, pp. 24; 49,50. 
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has been set forth in another connection. 27 The problem now 
to be considered is the application of the policy by Anti-
ochus to his realm as a whole and then seek to follow its 
application as it specially affects the Jews. 
Antiochus Epiphanes was the last prosecutor of a 
vigorous policy of Hellenization.28 The kingdom was rapidly 
becoming orientalized as he came to the throne. H1s father 
had founded many cities to counteract this tendency,29 but 
the population had quickly turned Aramaean in t he late 
Seleucid period through the influence of the unhellenized 
women. 3D otto declares, "dasz fur ihn die Kunst der Politik 
schon zur, Kunst des Unmoglichen geworden war. n31 As usual 
Otto's gloomy predictions concerning Antiochus seem to over-
draw the dark side of the picture.,' Antiochust policy met with 
signal success until he used force. Swain argues that 
Antiochus in conjunction with Eumenes II of Pergamum was 
seeking a resurgence of the Greeks in the face of an Oriental 
renascence. He has strong arguments in that Antiochus did 
27. Supra, 47-55. 
28. W. S. Ferguson, Qp,. Ci't., p. 195. Cf. W. Kolbe, 
Beitrage zur Syrischen und Judischen Geschichte. (Berlin: 
1926), p. 151. --- --
29. Cf. Livy, 37:54,22. 
30. CAH VII 194. 
31. W. Otto, Zur Geschicte ~ Zei~ des 2 ptolemaers 
(wissenschaften: 1934), p. S5. 
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cultivate the Greek world through generous gifts to Greek 
cities (p. 78); in his passive policy in the face of Rome 
(p. 78); in his kindness to the Greeks at Naucratis in 
Egypt; and in his sparing of the Greek soldiers in the army 
of Ptolemy after the battle at Pelusium (p. 81). In the 
face of the Oriental menace one would naturally suppose 
that Antiochus would oppose them. Many of Swain's tenuous 
suppositions, however, seem unjustified. His theory on the 
mission of Heliodorus to the Jewish Temple (pp. 76,7); his 
supposition that only the Greek soldiers were spared after 
Pelusius; his assumption that Eulaeus and Lenaeus had 
"effected what amounted to a nationalistic revolution giving 
orientals positions and power once held by the Greeks" 
(pp. 74,5), are unconvincing. Swain then fortifies this 
last assumption with the declaration that the regents went 
bankrupt because the Greeks would not pay taxes to them (p. 75) 
and his proof in that Eulaeus coined some currency in his own 
name and debased it. 
Antiochus was a throughgoing enthusiast for things 
Greek. That no one doubts.. But Antiochus' whole policy of 
Hellenization was an attempt to convert Orientals to Greek 
culture, not to dispossess the Orientals for the benefit of 
the Gree~ race. How could he hope to succeed in such a 
policy ··were he. to close the door to Greek life to anyone not 
, . 
of Greek blood? Ramsay has proved that Antiochus settled 
some Jews at Tarsus, which he refounded as Antioch, 171 B.C. 32 
These Jews were full citizens of thelfOA,s with special 
exemption from the religious obligations of citizenship.33 
At Jerusalem Jews sought and gained the reconstitution of 
"'" their city as a lroAI$ on the Greek model. 34 The coronation 
of Antiochus as king of Egypt at the hands of the native 
priests at Memphis was indicative of the fact that he sought 
to please the natives of Egypt rather' than to dispossess them. 
This was a continuation of the pro-native policy begun by 
Ptolemy V nwhich included extensive concessions to the 
natives. n35 One concludes that Rostovtzeff is nearer the 
truth when he says that Antiochus sought nto legalize a pro-
cess of amalgamation between orientals and Greeks which had 
apparently made great progress. n36 Such a plan would suit 
the needs of the hour more definitely and also match more 
perfectly with the facts as revealed in the sources. The 
racial issue cannot be injected successfully by Swain. 
32. W. M. Ramsay, QR. Cit., pp. 180ff. 
33. Ibid. 
34. II ~. 4:9. 
35. Swain, p. 86; Cf. Supra, p. 60; Papyrus Tebtunis 698. 





2. Jewish Hellenization. During the first part of his reign 
Antiochus no doubt "considered himself as the best friend of 
the Jewish race, and was so considered by many of the most 
influential Jews in Jerusalem.,,37 In fact he had a special 
interest in Jerusalem and later as an act of signal favor he 
gave it his own name. 
When Antiochus came to power he found that Onias III 
the high-priest at Jerusalem was doing all within his power 
to impede the process of Hellenization among his people. 38 
An enemy of Onias~. Joshua by name, offered Antiochus 440 
talents if he would make him high priest. 39 When this was 
acceded to Joshua, who had now hellenized his name to Jason, 
offered 150 talents to the king if he would constitute the 
ci ty of Jerusalem as a Greek-rlOA '.5 .40 "When the king had 
consented, and he had taken office, he immediately brought 
his countrymen over to the Greek way of living. n41 The 
special royal ordinances favoring the Jews were abrogated, 
the people put on new customs, the Gymnasium and the Greek 
37. RQuse Sel. p. 169. "The conservative party was over-
borne by the torrent.n--Bevan. 
38. n Macc. 4:5; Jos. Ant. 12:5; l~· 1:11-15. 
39. ll~· 4:9. CAR VIII, 
-
502. 
40. !m&. 4:10. 
41. lbid. 4:11ff. 
~ . 
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hat became the chief symbols of the new order. Even the 
priests of Jehovah hastened from the Temple to the wrestling 
school.42 There is nothing of coercion in this story from 
antagonistic Jewish sources as yet. All went well for three 
years until Jason's brother went to Antiochus and outbid him 
for the priesthood by 300 talants. The brother, who had 
hellenized his name from Oriias to Menelaus was installed in 
the high-priesthood by the Syrian army and Jason was exiled 
to the Ammonites. 43 
The first act of violence perpetrated by Antiochus 
upon the Jews was completely justified. Jason hearing that 
Antiochus was dead, attacked Antioch, {Jerusalem), and about 
half of the people joined him in the rebellion. Antiochus 
busy in Egypt naturally was disturbed to hear of fighting, in 
the rear of his large army, which menaced his supply lines. 
Thinking "that all Judea was in revolt, he set out from Egypt 
like a wild beast and took the city by storm.,,6 What unbiased 
reader would blame a ruler for punishing an insurrection in 
time of war? The thing that disturbed the Jews most, however, 
was the fact that Antiochus entered their Temple and profaned 
the holy of holies with his presence. He robbed the Temple, 
42. Ibid. 4:23f,; Jos. Ant. 12:5; Bouse Sel. p. 170; 
Swain 76. 
43. II Macc. 5:5ff; Schurer, Vol. I, p. 204. 
, 





taking all the gold he could find--about 1800 talents worth 
in all.44 Menelaus was restored as high priest. 
a. ~ 2f force. It was at the close of the Egyptian 
War that Antiochus used force to hellenize the Jewish nation. 
The reason for his use of force grew out of the change in the 
international set up. Otto avers that the Jewish policy of 
Antiochus was a psychological reaction to the frustration of 
his Egyptian Policy. Be then made the Jews a scapegoat for 
his anger and disapPOintment. 
Wie sticht sein vorgehen gegen die Juden, sein 
Hellenisierungspolitik in Palestine, in der Zeit 
naeh seiner Demutigung in AgYRten ab von jener, 
die er vorher getrieben hat.4' 
Nearer the truth, one feels, is the fact that Rome had taken 
Egypt out of Antiochus' control. No longer was Pe1usium the 
border fortress on the South. Judea was now the frontier. If 
the king's southern borders were to be secure during a 
prolonged campaign in the East, there must be no question 
about the loyalty of Judea. The king had hoped for a change 
in the opposition of the strict Jews. What he thought he 
saw was, 
a loyal party, readily accepting the genial culture 
which was to harmonize the Kingdom, on the one hand, 
and on the other a people perversely and dangerously 
solitary, resisting all efforts to amalgamate them 
44. !l ~acc. 5:15-20; I Macc. 1:20-24; Jos. Ant. 12:5:3. 






with the general system and only wai~ing the appear-
ance of a foreign invader to rebel. 4 . 
The ground for resistance was religion? Very well, either 
the religion must go or the people must be replaced by Greeks. 
He had no conception of what the Jewish religion was. He 
dared wait no longer. The Jews were already partly hellen-
ized of their own accord and it was the "advanced party" 
among the Jews which urged Antiochus to take more decided 
steps.47 Even after violence began Antiochus did not consider 
himself the enemy of the Jews but only of the violent and 
reactionary party.48 
b. The terror. 
Then the king wrote to his whole kingdom that they 
should all become one people, and everyone should give 
up his particular practices ••• And the king sent word 
to. • .Judah to follow practices foreign to the 
country and put a stop to whole burnt offerings and 
sacrifices and drink offerings at the sanctuary, and 
to break the sabbaths and profane the feasts and 
pollute sanctuary and sanctified. • .and anyone who 
did not obey the command of the king should die.41 
We shall probably have to look to the Hellenizing Jews, 
not only for the initiation but also for the system-
atic carrying out, of the policy. It was one of the 
commonest phenomena of ancient life. There was scarcely 
a defeated factor but summoned the public enemy into 
the city and by taeir aid took a cruel vengeance on 
their opponents.' 
46. Bouse Sel. p. 170. 
47. w. M. Ramsay, Q],. Cit. 183; Cf. II Macc. 5:2Jf. 
48. Ibid. p. 184. 
49. I Mace. 1:40ff. 




The king acted in concert with the Hellenizing Jews, the 
wealthy and powerful citizens of the city who were advising 
just a little force on the "recalcitrant minority" which so 
stubbornly opposed them and the day would be won. Antiochus 
naturally thought that the problem was more political than 
religious. The incorrigible Jews were to him the pro-Egyptian 
group. 
Der konig hat offenbar geglaubt, eine im Gang befind-
liche Entwicklung nicht mehr abwarten zu derfen. Er 
hat jedoch sein Ziel bei den Juden nicht nur nicht 
erreicht, sondern hat sogar in einem fur das Reich 
besonders wichtigen Grenzgebiete, das er sichern 
wollte, einen von jetzt an dauernd glimmenden gefahr-
lichen Brandherd geschaffen, d.h. hervorgerufem. 5l 
II Maccabees relates many incidents of the steadfast-
ness of the faithful under persecution. One story is of one 
Eleazar who was glad to undergo torture rather than eat pork. 52 
In another instance a mother and her seven sons suffered the 
most cruel tortures "rather than transgress the laws of our 
forefathers" and were finally fried in a great pan, one at 
a time. 53 Whatever the historical accuracy of these narratives, 
they do at least reflect an abiding faithfulness to their 
laws and a heroic willingness to suffer torture rather than 
far sake a meticulous observance of them. 
51. w. Otto, ~. Cit., p. 84. 
52. II ~. 6:18-31. 
53. Ibid., 7:1-42. 
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III. THE JEWISH REVOLT 
1. Causes. Rostovtzeff says, "The revolt of Judas was 
directed more against the ruling classes than against the 
central government."54 With this one can agree. One can 
likewise accept Rostovtzeff's reason for this revolt as a 
part of the total cause of the Jewish resistance, 
Judas represented the ideals and the dreams of the 
large masses of the natives, a class neglected by 
the government and exploited by the city bourgeoisie. 55 
This cannot however be the sole reason for the Jew's resist-
ance. Other cities were peopled by the oppressed. Other 
Temple states resisted the removal of their sacred funds. 
Nowhere else however do we see an approximation of the 
stubbornness and "unreasonableness of the Jews." There were 
additional reasons. 
The core of the matter was that there was bound to be 
a conflict between the two systems. Both felt that they were 
peculiar and had the message for the world. 56 "Exclusiveness 
was as pronounced in the one . case as it was rigid in the 
other."57 "Yet this very spirit of exclusiveness was one of 
the conditions which enabled each to nurture and to bring 
54. ~.!. p. 705. 
55. Ibid. 








to maturity the life-giving germ which it bore within it. n58 
As it was both have contributed to the enrichment of the world. 
The Greek spirit was anti-Jewish because it was bent on 
attaining the supremacy and crushing out all opposition. 59 It 
was a wonderful scheme of national education--the best of its 
time. It produced excellent results in Western Asia generally 
"but the Jews had more to lose than to gain by being 
hellenized_ n60 Hellenism had no enemy among other Syrian 
religions. They merely called their gods by Greek names when 
using the Greek language--but the Jews were monotheists. 
The antagonism between the two irreconcilable civil-
izations invested the resistance of the Jews with a 
peculiar bitterness, which was so ~conceivable to 
the Kings and their Greek subjects. ol 
But, 
there shone out in that intense moment the sterner 
and sublimer qualities which later Hellenism, ~d 
above all the Hellenism of Syria, hardly knew. 
There was, a difference between the gross conceptions 
of the Greek and Syrian gods and goddesses and the high 
monotheism of the Jews. There was a difference between the 
58. Norman Bentwich, Hellenism (Philadelphia: The 
Jewish Publication Society of America, 1919), p. 27:--
59. W. M. Ramsay, QR. Cit., p. 89. 
60. Ibid. p. 182. 
61. Pierre Jouguet, ~. Cit., p. 378. 
62. House ~. p. 174. 
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high ethical ideals of the Jewish sacred writings and the 
practices of the Greeks who: "!illed the temple with pro-
fligacy and revelry, amusing themselves. with prostitutes and 
lying with women within the sacred precincts. n63 With all its 
faults, the Maccabean rising preserved the Jewish race from 
being merged in Hellenism and kept it free from its destiny.64 
2. ~ill~ warfare and attempts at suppression. The only 
means of resistance open to the Jewish zealots was guerilla 
The higher classes composing the ruling cast of warfare. 
the tr~)..'> were Greeks and Hellenistic Jews, many of them in 
the third or fourth generation. 65 One group of zealots 
escaped from Antioch (Jerusalem), to Modin, where their 
leader Mattathias was bidden to offer sacrifice to the 
"manifest god!" He refused, and furthermore killed a fellow 
Jew who had stepped foreward to comply. Then he killed the 
officer who was enforcing the king's edict. He also destroy-
ed the altar. With a parting invitation to the crowd to 
63. II Mace. 6:4. 
64. W. M. Ramsay, ~. Cit. p. 182. 
65. Cf. Max Radin, QQ. Qlt., p. 145; Only Hellenists 
and Greeks were allowed citizenship in a Greek -rrd'A 1,$ • 
Naturally all Hellenistic Jews would seek the advantages 
which citizenship offered. The citizens were the ruling 
caste. Others could dwell in the city but could not share 





follow him, the old priest and his sons fled to the hills. 
They soon organized a guerilla band which through fortunate 
circumstances was to wrest practical autonomy from their 
Seleucid persecutors. 66 
This little group of rebels noted that a similar band 
of fugitives was annihilated when it refused to fight on the 
Sabbath. Mattathias and his followers determined to fight 
. 67 
on the Sabbath if necessary for defence. Thus they were co~-
promising already in a war which was begun because the rebels 
could stand for nothing but the strictest adherence to their 
legal religious customs and restrictions. 
In these early days Mattathias and his sons, later 
called the Hasmoneans were joined by a warlike group of 
Israelites called Hasidians. 68 
II s f 6tait forme en Judee merne un parti de gens qui 
trouvaient inco~mode et deraisonnable l'isolement 
auquel les condamnait l'observance rigoureuse de la 
Loi. L'etait l,~aristocratie de la nation ••• ils 
souhaitaient d'etre delivres par religieuse de leurs 
compatriotes.69 
They were characterized as "volunteers for the law,n 70 which 
would indicate that their quarrel with Syria was religious. 
66. I ~££. 2:1-28. 
67. I~. 2:29-41. 
68. From 0 ~ 1'0 n meaning saints or righteous. 
• • T 
". 69. Bouche-Leclercq, ~. Cit., p. 238. 





Now the combined company amounted to 6000 men who not only 
opposed hellenization themselves but would not allow others 
to accept it and further forced recalcitrant Jews into an 
outward conformity to the Jewish law of circumcision. The 
Jew could not think of freedom apart from a compulsary obed-
ience by the whole nation to their law. Later this conform-
ity was forced on peoples of other nationality. Not long 
after the revolt began old Mattathias died. Be had appointed 
his third son Judas to be captain and Simon, his second son, 
chief counselor. 
Antiochus had departed for the East to furthur his 
plan to restore his empire in the East. Lysias, his viceroy 
was governor in charge of all the kingdom west of the 
71 Euphrates. The problem of the Judean insurgents was of 
very minor importance to Antiochus but at the same time it 
was essential to have a well-ordered border province. 72 
Two minor attempts were made to put down these wild hill 
fighters in 166. Appollonius with the aid of some Samaritans 
set out in p·wsui t of Judas but they were ambushed and slain. 
Apollonius f sword was thereafter worn by the outlaw. 7'] 
Seron, commander of the Syrian arm~with a small detachment 
71. Ibid. 3:32. 
72. CAB, VIII, p. 514. 
73. l~. 3:10-12. 
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was also ambush~d in the pass at Bethhoron by Judas and fled 
to the cities of Philistia. 74 
Another ineffectual attempt to stop Judas, in ,165, is 
recorded. 75 Three captains, Ptolemy, Nicanor and Gorgias, 
with a force of 40,000 men ,and 7000 horses came to take the 
country. Jason of Cyrene says that Nicanor sought to enslave 
the Jewish nation and thus pay the Roman indemnity of 2000 
talants. Be invited the slave traders to follow him offering 
to market the captured Jews at the rate of 90 per talent. 76 
While the Greek force was divided and Gorgias was seeking to 
locate and destroy Judas' camp, Judas made a night attack on 
the main Greek camp at Emmaus of the plain and took it. The 
rebel restrained his well-disciplined men from looting until 
Gorgias returned and then bested the general, thus nipping 
the Greek campaign in the bud. The slave dealers had under-
gone the ardors of their journey·in vain. 
3. ~jg1!~ effgrts a t r§.B.~sipn. Up to this point the 
Jewish affair had not been greatly disturbing to the leaders 
74. Ibig. 
75. ~. 3:38-4:25. 
76. II Macc. 8:10. Of course the indemnity haq been paid 
long since-but it had been so prominent that it was natural 
for the Jews to understand it as the object of any great 
attempt to raise funds. The numbers of the Syrian force are 
doubtless an ex~ration. One wonders how the Jews obtained 
such accurate information as to the exact numbers of their 
opponents. 
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at Antioch. Antioch (Jerusalem), was completely pacified and 
UDIQughly hellenized. Judas had been considered a problem 
for the local administrators. They were assigned the task of 
mopping-up the Judean bands of recalcitrants who roamed the 
wilderness. The Singular lack of succeSf, on the part of the 
underlings however finally aroused Lysia, the governor, to a 
personal effort. 60,000 picked men were sent south of Jeru-
salem to Bethsura in Idumea. By this time Judas had an army 
of 10,000. No doubt this "expedition was from the viewpoint 
of the Greeks a reconoitering movement to feel out the 
strength of the rebels and ascertain just what the situation 
required. Again Judas is alleged to have routed the Greeks. 
"In view of the ease with which even distinct defeats are 
seen to be transfigured in the imagination of the Jewish 
writers into Victories, it may be questioned whether much 
damage was inflicted upon the regent's army.n77 Lysias was 
forced however to take a serious view of the matter. He 
retired to Antioch to recruit more mercenaries and continue 
the struggle on a more active scale. 78 
4. Rededica~iop Qf !h! lem21e. Following this Victory Judas 
and his brothers determined to rededicate the Temple in 
77. Hou~ §~., p. 180. 





Jerusalem to Jehovah, their God. In all these struggles 
Jerusalem had been securely in the hands of the Greeks with a 
strong garrison in the citadel. Bevan surmises that Lysias 
allowed the Hasmoneans to enter Jerusalem and rededicate the 
Temple. 79 Jewish sources however insist that Judas and his 
party were now strong enough to hold off the garrison in 
the citadel and take possession of the city in their own 
80 
strength. The Temple was ceremonially cleansed and reded-
icated with great rejoicing on the same day of the year 
(December 25) on which it had been poluted three years before. 
The event was so important to them that they ordered that the 
same period should be observed each year as the Feast of 
Dedication or the Feast of LightS. 8l 
Thus these zealots had secured the first of their 
objectives--religious toleration for themselves and the pos-
~e3~on of their Temple for the worship of Jehovah, their God. 
They fortified Mount Zion against the Syrian garrison and 
Bethzura against the Idumeans and looked foreward to the 
future with faith and courage. 82 
79. QAR, VIII, 515. 
80. l~. 4:36ff. 
81. II~. 10:1-8. 
82. 1 Macc. 4:60, 1. 
J . 
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4. Period Qf Toleration. One is inclined to side with Bevan 
and accept the death of Antiochus Epiphanes as the occasion 
for leniency on the part of Lysias, the Governor, who then 
allowed the Jews to rededicate their temple. Ptolemy Macron, 
the governor of Coele-Syria, was friendly toward the Jews 
and counseled a policy of moderation and amicability.83 When 
Judas went so far as to attack the citadel in Antioch (Jerusaem), 
however Lysias, who seems to have had control over the young 
Antiochus V as regent, was forced to take vigorous action. 
Be organized a real punitive expedition against Judas in 162. 
Lysias and the boy king marched against Bethzura and then 
against~eareby Bethzechariah. The fanatic zeal of Judas' 
men, illustrated by the heroic death of Judas' own brother 
Eleazar, was not enough to stem the tide of a real Greek army 
of superior forces. The Jews were defeated and fell back on 
Jerusalem. Resistance was difficult for the Jews because it 
was a Sabattical year. Destruction seemed certain for them 
until Lysias was diverted from the siege by the return of 
Philip, the regent appointed by Antiochus Epiphanes. Philip 
was nearing Antioh, the capital, at the head of the victorious 
Eastern Army_ With this threat at his back Lysias came to 






terms with the Jews confirming tAeir religious toleration. 
The Greeks then evacuated the city after destroying the 
fortress of the Jews on Mount Zion. 84 
Thereafter the dynastic difficulties of the Seleucids 
were the inhibiting factor in their rule of JUdea. The 
pacification came too late for Epiphanes, however. The Sel-
eucid power was on the wane and the Jews enjoyed practical 
autonomy (at its expense) except when a strong ruler like 
Demetrius I or Antiochus .VII Sidetes reigned. 






I. PERSONALITY OF ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES 
Antiochus Epiphanes has been misrepresented in history 
because he has been misunderstood. l He is revealed by 
research as a strong, vigorous character who should have a 
high place among rulers because of his abilities. His 
analysis of his kingdom's problems and his vigorous efforts 
to ameliorate these conditions and succeed against tremend-
ous obstacles is laudable. 2 Impartial judgement would deem 
his persecution of the Jews as an error, but an error largely 
due to ignorance of the true situation on his part. 3 He knew 
nothing of the Jewish problem first hand and was the victim 
of his advisors. 
II. HISTORICAL 
1. Importance of ~h~ East. The eastern campaigns of Antio-
chus III and Antiochus Epiphanes demonstrate that the country 
east of M~opotamia deserves a much higher rank in our 
consideration of Hellenism and its history.4 The Middle East 
1. Cf. pp. 4; 38;9. 
2. ~d. 
3. Cf. pp. 89,90. 




and the Farther East have been completely lost sight of in 
all too many cases whereas the Seleucids saw there what pro-
mised to be a most important element of their empire. 
2. Egypti!Q Campaigns. There is no justification in the 
sources for more than two Egyptian campaigns.5 Polybius is 
too trustworthy to be sidetracked for the sake of one word, 
in as unreliable a work as that by Jason of Cyrene or because 
of a vague vision of Daniel. Livy is befuddled on the issue 
but has many of the facts in confused farm which would lead 
to a two campaign view. 
3. Antiochus and the ~~. Antiochus' policy toward the 
Jews on the whole must be reckoned as one of friendship.6 
The dominant party of the Jews were hellenized and that of 
their own Seeking. 7 Antiochus Epiphanes saw his opponents 
as a recalcitrant minority and he permitted the majority in 
the autonomous state of Antioch (Jerusalem), to use his name 
and power in dealing with the few who hindered the complete 
hellenization of the people. 8 His relations with the 
dispersion Jews was cordial. 9 
4. Maccabean~. From a military point of view the 
5. p. 59, n. 5la. 
6. p. 9lf. 
7. p. 88ff. 
8. Ibid. 
9. p. 91, n. a. 
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Maccabean wars (if they may be dignified by that name), 
. 10 
were of little practical value. The disruption of the 
Macedonian kingdoms was in progress. In particular were the 
bonds restraining the subject pejples of the Seleucid Empire 
djss'olving. This resulted in freedom for Parthia, Bactria 
and other groups which had been subject to the Empire as well 
as for the Jews. When the Seleucid power was weakened by 
dynastic strife or outside interference the Jews were able to 
assert some little independence--this was never complete. On 
the other hand whenever a strong Seleucid ruler such as 
Demetrius I or Antiochus VII Sidetes came to the throne, the 
Jewish pseudo-independence vanished.ll 
III. RELIGIOUS 
Although the Kaccabean wars were of little consequence 
politically, the religious results of the struggle were quite 
significant. They have affected the history of the Jews down 
to the present time. 
1. Preservation 2£ monotheism. The outstanding result of 
this struggle was the preservation of a pure ethical monotheism 
in the face of a threat to its very existence. Whereas the 
people of Judea, led by the priesthood, has been unconcerned 
10. p. 101. 
11. Ibid. 
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heretofore, the struggle which Judas led, infused the Nation 
with a determination to resist any effort to destroy their 
religion or to alter their monotheistic conception of· God. 
This conception has enriched the world. It paved the way 
for the Christian religion and the Mohammedan as well. 
2. lewish exclusivenes~. The struggle demonstrated first 
of all the basie mutual incompatibility of the two religious 
12 
and philisophical systems; Judaism and Hellenism. They 
were mutually exclusive until the power of Christianity 
merged the two philosophies.13 
3. Dispersion Jewp. Of far reaching importance was the 
revival in the religious and racial loyalties of the diaspora, 
or the group of Jews dispersed over the world. They had 
heretofore been slowly but nonetheless surely drifting away 
from the customs of their fathers. From this point foreward 
they develope into the heirs of Judaism both in its Christian 
development an~ in the Jewish remnant which was left after 
the destruc~ion of the Temple and the scattering of the 
nation by Titus in 70 A.D. 
4. Palestinian Judaism. From this period foreward the Jew-
ish religion became ~ssified and reactionary in its exclu-
12. pp. 92,3. 
13. W.M. Ramsay, The Cities of St. Paul (New York: 
A.C. Armstrong and Son;-I909J, IntrOd~ 
: I 
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sion of all non-Jewish elements. The party of the Pharasees 
developed in this period and the Zealots drew their inspir-
ation falsely, but nonetheless certainly, from the exploits of 
Judas, the Maccabee and his brethren. 
5. APocalyptic. The Apocalyptic literature flowered under 
the pressure of hellenistic force. The first Martyrologies 
were developed in this period and passed over into Christian 
literature as a type. 
The search for a military and political messiah which 
so dominated the world in Jesus f day sprang up from these 
roots. It gave form to Messianism. 
In this period Apocalyptic writings were extant. l4 
Daniel in the canon and others of the Apocrypha which molded 
the form as a type, found their chief impetus in the Maccabean 
struggle. This whole development laid the background for the 
Kingdom of God movement initiated by John the Baptist and 
carried foreward by Jesus. 
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